Order.-These petitions raise a questions, of Court-fee. The suits filed by the petitioner, is the same in all the petitions were in ejectment the respondent in each case being the tenant. The plaint in each case alleged that the defendant had accepted the plaintiff as the owner of the property and agreed that he would surrender vacant possession of the suit land after removing the superstructure and that the tenant had put up superstructure. The plaint further stated that the tenancy was governed by the provisions of City Tenants Protection Act and, therefore, the requirement of that Act had been, complied with by the issue of a proper notice. The prayer in the suits was for a decree that the defendant should put the plaintiff in possession of the suit property and the superstructure thereon, on receiving a compensation of Rs. 1,000 the market value of the superstructure, and Rs. 2 for the tree and for payment of arrears of rent as may be determined For the purpose of Court-fee the prayer was valued under section 43(2) of the Madras Court-lees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955 and a Court-fee of Rs. 1-12 was paid. The Court-fee Examiner was of the view that a total Court-fee of Rs. 1-20 was payable and there is no dispute about it He was further of the view that as the plaint asked for possession of the superstructure on payment of Rs. 1,000, the plaintiff should pay additional Court-fee on the value of the superstructure namely Rs. 1,000. The Court-fee Examiner’s view was accepted by the Court below which directed payment of additional Court-fee. These petitions are to revise those orders of the Court below.

It is contended for the petitioner that the prayer for recovery of possession of the superstructure was but incidental to the prayer for recovery of possession of the pro-perty which was the subject-matter of tenancy and, therefore, no Court-fee is payable on the value of the superstructure. It seems to me that the contention is well founded The petitioner does not claim to be the owner of the superstructure and in fact the recital in the plaint is that under the tenancy agreement, the defendant in each of the suits was bound to put the plaintiff in vacant possession of the land. But the question of compensation arises because of the provisions of the City Tenants Protection Act and in order to comply with the provisions of the Act, the plaintiff according to the averments in the plaint, gave notice to the tenants. In that sense, therefore, the prayer for recovery of possession of the superstructure on payment of Rs. 1, 000 is incidental to the prayer for recovery of possession of the land which was the subject-matter of the lease.

The submission made for the petitioner is supported by authority. Reference under Court-fees Act, section 51, related to a claim by tenants for improvements in a suit by a landlord for ejectment, which claim was disallowed. In an appeal tiled by the tenants for improvements, the question arose as to what was the proper Court-fee payable on the memorandum of appeal. The appellant there had paid Court-fee in accordance with the plaint valuation. This Court held that as the claim for improvements was not the subject-matter of the suit was merely incidental to the decree for possession, the fee payable by an appeallant in such a case should be that payable for possession of the land. More or less the same principle was laid down in Haidari Begam v. Gulzar Bano2. That was also a suit for possession but the defence was that the defendant had a lien for her dower debt The question, the Court had to decide, was as to what was the value of amount of the subject-matter of the appeal arising out of the suit. This was answered by the Court thus:

“It is suggested that it is not only the property in dispute but also the dower debt claimed by the appellant. It is perfectly true that it is open to this Court to grant a decree to the plaintiff conditional on payment of whatever may be found due to the defendant as her

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