Child indicates only a person of tender years.

This revision proceeding, which I am segregating with regard to its facts for the time being, also primarily involves a point of law, upon which there has been a marked divergence of opinion, as between the various High Courts in India. The point of law may be expressed in the following form: Do the words “ if any person having sufficient means neglects or refuses to maintain......his legitimate or illegitimate child unable to maintain itself” occurring in section 488 (1), Criminal Procedure Code, imply that the word ‘child’ means, in that context, a person of tender years, a person of less than maturity, or (alternatively) a person who is the issue of that parent, without reference to age?

This matter, of course, has arisen for consideration upon several occasions in this Court, and has been subject of the decisions of various High Courts in India, I had occasion to consider the true interpretation in Ibrahim v. Saidani Bi1, where I have referred to the judgments of (1) Panchapakesa Ayyar, J., in Subbamma v. Venkata Reddi2, (2) Lakshmana Rao, J., in Kanniah v. Rajammal3, (3) a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Ranehoddas Narottamdass v. Emperor4, Hemanta Kumar Banerji v. Manorama Debi5, and (5) Purnasashi Devi v. Nagendar Nath6. In my view, there expressed the word ‘child’ as occurring in section 488(1), Criminal Procedure Code, can only denote a person of tender years, not yet sui juris. Where a person is legally capable of entering into contracts and instituting suits, that person cannot any longer be considered a ‘child’. I shall now refer to little more extensively to the conflict of the case-law on this aspect, in order to elucidate the reference that I am making in this matter.

In Krishnaswamy Iyer v. Chandravadana7, Sankaran Nair, J., took the view that I have adumbrated above. The learned Judge pointed out that the word ‘child ‘had not been defined in the Criminal Procedue Code, and that in United Kingdom, it has various statutory definitions. Panchapakesa Ayyar, J., in Subbamma v. Venkata Reddy2, affirmed this view and acutely emphasised what could be the logical consequence of a contrary view. In Kanniah v. Rajammal3, Lakshmana Rao, J., expressed a different view. But this is a very brief decision, and the facts were not fully furnished. Ranchhoddas Narottamdass v. Emperor4, and Hemanta Kumar Banerji v. Manorama Debi5, take the view that I have expressed.

But it must be equally conceded that many High Courts in India have taken a contrary view. They include the Calcutta, Bombay, Mysore, Nagpur and Kerala High Courts, and since it is not further necessary to analyse the case-law here, I am merely indicating the references herewith; Purnasashi Devi v. Nagendra Nath6, W.L. Faria v. Anita Meriene Faria8, Ahmed Mahomed v. Bai Fatma9, Ismail Sheriff v. Nasarin10, State v. Ishwarlal11, and Saraswathi v. Madhavan12.

Before making the present reference, I attempted to delve into the etymological roots of the words in the absence of any statutory definition in the Criminal Procedure Code. But I must confess that the attempt has not been very successful. The reason is that the word ‘child’ has been given a statutory definition in several enactments in the United Kingdom pointed out by Sankaran Nair, J., in Krishnaswami Iyer v. Chandravadana7. Etymologically speaking, the word has two different senses, one of which is that of an infant, or a person of tender years, or one who has not attained maturity of either sex. But an equally permissible meaning derived from a root of the word, is that it indicates the issue of the parent or parents concerned. The relevant preference will be found in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary and in Burrows Words and Phrases, Volume I, page 428, and also in Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 14, 1109. In the last authoritative work, the following passage, which is of great interest, occurs:

“The term has a second Well understood meaning, irrespective of parentage, and imports minority, i