This is an appeal against the order of the District Judge of Madurai, dismissing the petition of the appellants claiming a compensation of Rs. 3,000 for the death of their son caused by the vehicle MDU 5390 driven by the 2nd respondent, on the ground that the driver was acquitted of the charge under section 304-A,. Indian Penal Code. Evidently, the learned Judge has not bestowed his attention to the case-law on the subject. It has been held in a number of decisions of this Court that any decision in a criminal case cannot be relied on as one binding in a civil action. Equally the findings in a civil proceeding are not binding on a subsequent prosecution founded upon the same or similar allegations.

In Venkatapathi v. Balappa1, a Bench of this Court consisting of Curgenven and Sundaram Chetty, JJ., had to consider the question whether the decision rendered in a criminal proceeding is liable to be considered in a suit for damages for malicious prosecution. There, Curgenven, J., observed:

“........I am unable to agree that our Evidence Act justifies an examination of the judgment of the criminal Court in order to ascertain the grounds upon which the acquittal proceeded and the views taken by the trying Magistrate of the evidence. Under section 43 of the Evidence Act it appears to me that the judgment can be used only to establish the fact that an acquittal has taken place as a fact in issue in the civil suit. I know of no provision of the Act which will justify the civil Court in taking into consideration the grounds upon which that acquittal was based and upon this point I am in agreement with Gulabchand v. Chunilal2and Shubrati v. Shams-ud-din3, in the view that there is no such provision.”

This judgment has been followed by Mockett, J., in In re Chakka Jagga Rao1, who made the following observation:-

"In a civil action for assault which is an action in tort the fact that the defendant has been convicted or acquitted in a criminal Court is relevant only as to the fact of the conviction or acquittal and it is totally irrelevant on the question whether the conviction or acquittal was right that is to say whether the assault was or was not committed. In other words it is a record of the proceeding in a criminal Court and nothing more and a civil Court should embark upon an inquiry before it on the same facts without being influenced in any way whatever by the conclusion at which the criminal Court has arrived; in other words, what may be a plea of ‘autrefois acquit ‘or ‘autrefois convict ‘under section 403, Criminal Procedure Code, cannot possibly be a plea of res judicata."

In Kutumba Rao v. Venkataramayya2, a suit for damages for malicious prosecution, Somasundaram, J., extracted the observations of Curgenven, J., in Venkatapathi v. Balappa3, and held:

".......... It is the duty of the civil Court to consider the evidence adduced in support of the defendants’ version and assess its value to find out if there is reasonable and probable cause."

In Anil Behari v. Lalike Bala Dassi4, the Supreme Court considered whether the previous judgment of Criminal Court convicting son for murder of testator is relevant in subsequent proceeding for revocation of grant of probate. On this question the Supreme Court made the following observations:

"On this question the Courts below have assumed on the basis of the judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the High Court in the Sessions trial that Charu was the murderer. Though the judgment is relevant only to show that there was such a trial resulting in the conviction and sentence of Charu to transportation for life, it is not evidence of the fact that Charu was the murderer. That question has to be decided on evidence."

In Hollington v. F. Hewthorn & Co.5, an action arose out of a collision between two motor cars on the highway in which the plaintiff alleged negligence on the part of the defendant driver. The plaintiff sought to give evidence of a conviction of the defendant-driver of carele