Order of composition can be made even after cancellation or suspension of permit.

Three buses belonging to the petitioner were found not running for certain periods during the year 1956-57. The Regional Transport Authority took action against the petitioner under section 60 of the Motor Vehicles Act. A notice issued to the petitioner called upon him to show cause why the permits of all the 15 vehicles belonging to the petitioner should not be suspended or cancelled. After an enquiry, the Regional Transport Authority made an order directing the cancellation of the permit of three vehicles which were not being used for more than 45 days. Against this order of the Regional Transport Authority dated 21st January, 1958, an appeal was taken to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, which confirmed the order of cancellation by its older, dated 28th April, 1958. These orders were the subject-matter of W. P. No. 365 of 1958. That petition failed and a further Writ Appeal was also dismissed on 31st January, 1962.

Thereafter, the petitioner moved the Regional Transport Authority praying that in lieu of cancellation of the permits, the petitioner might be permitted to pay a monetary penalty under section 60(3) of the Act. The Regional Transport Authority examined the contention of the petitioner that no opportunity had been given to him to compound the offence. He held that the wording of section 60(3) did not confer a right upon the permit holder, but that it was within the discretion of the authority alone to compound the offence. He thought that no provision existed under section 60(3) of the Act for the grant of an opportunity to show that that provision should be invoked. He observed that the expression “instead of cancelling or suspending the permit”, appearing in section 60(3) of the Act, would apply only if the permit had not already been cancelled ; but that if the permit had already been cancelled, the authority which cancelled the permit must be deemed to have exercised its discretion. In this view, he held that there was no provision to enable the authority to re-open the matter and consider the applicability of section 60(3) of the Act.

Against this order, a revision was taken to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal referred to certain decisions of this Court and took the view that the Regional Transport Authority and the State Transport Appellate Tribunal had become functus officio after the disposal of the proceedings before them; that is to say, when once these authorities dealt with a proceeding under section 60(1) and directed the cancellation of the permit and such cancellation had also been confirmed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, no power survived to these authorities to reconsider the matter of compounding the offence under section 60(3) of the Act. The Appellate Tribunal also thought that if the question were to be considered at the stage of implementing the order of the Regional Transport Authority cancelling the permit, it would amount to a review of its earlier order. Finally, the Tribunal observed that the right to compound was impliedly negatived by the Regional Transport Authority and that, therefore, the application for compounding now made could not be sustained.

These orders of the Regional Transport Authority and the State Transport Tribunal are canvassed in this writ petition, the principal ground urged by the petitioner being that the power of the authority to compound in terms of the section arose only on the determination that the permit is liable to be cancelled or suspended; that is to say, only after the appropriate authority gives a finding that the petitioner has contravened any of the provisions of the Act set out in section 60(1), clauses (a), (b) or (e). According to the petitioner, the authority is bound to examine the question in the light of section 60(3) of the Act only after it reaches the conclusion that the permit is liable to be cancelled or suspended. There is no limitation, so it is contended, in