One Sepoy Chidambara Udayar was last owner of the suit property He left India for Malaya in 1930. Before leaving he mortgaged the property in favour of the defendant’s husband. At the same time, he granted a lease in favour of Karuppanna Udayar, who was his divided paternal uncle. He died in Malaya in 1932 without any issues. The plaintiff claiming to be the son of an undivided brother of Sepoy Chidambara Udayar came to India in 1958. He ascertained that Muthammal, the widow of Karuppanna Udayar, and her son, had sold the suit property to the husband of the first defendant, the mortgagee. The sale was in discharge of the mortgage executed by Sepoy Chidambara Udayar. The plaintiff, claiming that Muthammal was incompetent to sell the property, pleaded that the conveyance was void and not binding upon him. He alleged further that the sale was in breach of confidence and faith and that he came to know of the fraud only on his return to India, and on such averments claimed that the suit was not barred by limitation.

The defendant contended that the plaintiff is not the son of the brother of Sepoy Chidambara Udayar. It was alleged that the defendant had prescribed for title to the suit property by virtue of long, undisturbed and open possession from 1935 onwards when the sale was executed in favour of her husband. The bar of limitation was also set up. It was denied that where was any entrustment of the property by Sepoy Chidambara Udayar to his uncle, the deceased Karuppanna Udayar.

The trial Court accepted the relationship of the plaintiff to Sepoy Chidambara Udayar. Though it accepted the plea that Sepoy Chidambara Udayar had entrusted the property with his uncle Karuppanna Udayar to be looked after by him and thereby constituted him a trustee, it held that the right of the plaintiff could be agitated within twelve years from the date of the alienation by the trustee or his successor, failing which the title would be lost. The plaintiff was born only in 1940. Plaintiff’s father, Ramaswami Udayar, the undivided brother of Sepoy Chidambara Udayar, was however alive on the date of the impugned alienation. Limitation would start to run as against him from the date of the sale. If that should be the position, then the plaintiff cannot claim that he would under law be entitled to sue for relief within three years of attaining majority. He accordingly found that the plaintiff had no subsisting title and dismissed the suit. On appeal, the learned Subordinate Judge took a different view. The principal questions which the lower appellate Court had to decide were whether the appellant’s suit was in time and whether the respondent had acquired title by adverse possession. Before the lower appellate Court, the alleged fraud by the heirs of Karuppanna Udayar or entrustment of the property to that person was apparently given up. The lower appellate Court held that since the heirs of Karuppanna Udayar should be deemed to continue in possession only on the basis of a lessee’s interest, they could not convey anything more than that interest. It accordingly reached the conclusion that the tenancy never came to an end until 1958 when the plaintiff returned to India and demanded possession of the property. In the view of the lower appellate Court, the suit was not barred by Article 139 of the Limitation Act and the respondent did not acquire any title in the property by adverse possession. The appeal was allowed.

The defendant in the suit prefers this second appeal. Mr. R. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, learned Counsel for the appellant, urges that on and after the termination of the lease, the heirs of the lessee Karuppanna Udayar cannot be regarded as lessees and it is open to them to acquire title by adverse possession. It cannot also be contended that these persons are tenants holding over, for that would require the assent of the landlord. The lease was granted in the year 1930 and was for a period of five years. Karuppanna Udayar, the lessee, died