No notice of vacancy given by the landlord.

The two appeals were tried. together as it was felt that a common question arises in them. The common question in these cases is the proper interpretation of section 3 (8) (a) (i) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1949 (hereinafter called the Act), which confers a right on the State Government to empower any of its Officers to summarily dispossess a landlord, tenant or other person occupying a building to which the Act applies, in certain eventualities. In both the appeals the State of Madras represented by the Accommodation Controller appeals against the order of Veeraswami, J., in Writ Petition No. 1049 of 1959 (leading upto Writ Appeal No. 187 of 1962) and in Writ Petition No. 1080 of 1959 (leading upto Writ Appeal No. 279 of 1962). The decision in Writ Petition No. 1049 of 1959 is reported in Amar Singh v. State of Madras,1In both these cases a vacancy arose in respect of a residential house, but the landlord failed to give the statutory notice as required in section 3 (1) (a) of the Act, within the prescribed time of seven days. The landlord thereafter put a new tenant in possession, without reference to the Accommodation Controller. The authorities prosecuted the landlord before the Magistrate for failure to give the notice, and he was convicted and fined. The Accommodation Controller then gave notice to the newly inducted tenants, directing them to vacate the premises in their occupation, relying upon section 3 (8) (a) (i) of the Act. The two tenants then filed Writ Petitions before this Court, which came up before Veeraswami, J. In his order dealing with Writ Petition No. 1049 of 1959, the learned Judge allowed the Writ Petition, holding that the Accommodation Controller had no right to recover possession under section 3 (8)(a) (i) of the Act, and quashed the notice given by the Accommodation Controller to the tenant to vacate the premises. For a like reason the other Writ Petition was also allowed, and an order quashing the notice was passed. The State Government represented by the Accommodation Controller, has filed the two appeals. It was since represented at the time of the hearing of the appeals, that so far as Writ Appeal No. 187 of 1962 is concerned, the premises let out constitute only a portion, and that in regard to the rest of the portion, the landlord had been in occupation at all material times. Section 3 (10) (c) of the Madras Act XVIII of 1960 (which has amended the earlier Act), excluded from the operation of the rule about dispossession for failure to give notice of vacancy, a building of the above type. Therefore it was pointed out, that even if we are to allow the Writ Appeal No. 187 of 1962, and hold that the tenant was liable to be evicted under the prior Act, the Accommodation Controller would not be in a position to let the premises to any other person, because the new Act, which must apply for that purpose, will not cover a building of this description. Therefore no practical purpose, will be served by dealing with the propriety of the direction to vacate, so far as Writ Appeal No. 187 of 1962 is concerned.

But in the case of Writ Appeal No. 279 of 1962, a similar state of things does not obtain, and in fact the premises had been let in two portions to two different persons. There is, therefore, necessity to consider the correctness of the order in Writ Petition No. 1080 of 1959, which has led up to Writ Appeal No. 279 of 1962. The relevant provision of the Act, section 3 (8) (a) (i), is this:

"Any landlord, tenant or other person occupying any building in contravention of the provisions of this section or any landlord who fails to deliver to the State Government possession of any building in respect of which they are deemed to be the tenant by virtue of this section:

The learned Advocate-General who appeared for the State Government, points out-in our opinion rightly that this section has two limbs, namely, (i) any landlord, tenant or other person occupying an