Legal representative not entitled to continue the writ.

The petitioner, since deceased; was a Police Head Constable against whom certain charges were framed. A departmental enquiry thereinto resulted in an order of dismissal from service. The petitioner, after exhausting his remedies by way of appeal, came to this Court seeking the issue of writ of certiorari on certain grounds which it is unnecessary to refer to. Since filing the petition, he died and his legal representatives have come on record.

The preliminary question arises whether the writ proceedings are maintainable in the circumstances of the case. It is contended by the learned Counsel appearing for the State that any order that can be made in this case is of an interest personal only to the dismissed officer, and that since the legal representatives can claim no personal right, they cannot agitate the question. On behalf of the petitioners, Mr. Mohan urges that this being an application for the issue of writ of certiorari what is sought is only to have the offending record removed. Reference has been made to Basappa v. Magappa1. Dealing with the features of a writ of certiorari, their Lordships of the Supreme Court point out that it can be availed of to remove or adjudicate on the validity of judicial acts,which includes the exercise of quasi-judicial functions by administrative bodies or authorities. Another feature is that the control by way of a writ of certiorari is exercised over judicial or quasi-judicial tribunals not in an appellate but in a supervisory capacity. The superior Court only demolishes the order which it considers to be without jurisdiction or palpably erroneous The offending order is put out of the way as one which should not be used to the detriment of any person. In Han Visum Kamath v. Syed Ahmed Ishane2where a question arose whether a writ could issue against a tribunal which had ceased to exist, their Lordships of the Supreme Court observe that a writ of certiorari is only directed against a record and that the fact that the tribunal which made the order become functus officio could not affect the jurisdiction of the Court to remove the record Relying upon these decisions, learned Counsel for the petitioners argues that whether or not the petitioner, the dismissed officer, is dead can make no difference to the relief sought, viz., that the order which is impugned should be quashed on grounds which are relevant to a proceeding in writ.

On behalf of the State, a decision of the Supreme Court in Cal. Gas Company v. State of West Bengal3has been relied upon. Dealing with Article 226 it is pointed out herein that it does not cover only the area of fundamental rights and that persons other than those claiming fundamental rights had also approached the High Court for relief under the Article. But it is emphasised that the exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction in granting the relief must be one to enforce a legal right.

"The right sought to be enforced under that Article should ordinarily be a personal and individual right of the petitioner himself, though in the case of some writs like habeas corpus or quo warranto this rule may be relaxed. It is accordingly the contention of the State that since the issue of a writ as sought is only to quash the order of dismissal and restore him to his rights in the service of the State, it is a personal right that is sought to be ventilated and that therefore when the petitioner is no longer alive to avail himself of the benefits of the remedy, the writ cannot issue.

There is considerable force in the contention of the State. It may be noticed that the charges against the Head Constable included corruption. Assuming that the impugned order is quashed on the ground urged in the petition, viz., that the procedure adopted by the authorities was opposed to the principles of natural justice, or that the rules governing the enquiry have not been followed, the position would be that the Department would be entitled to continue the proceedings afresh against the de