Applicability of principles to the deed of settlement.

The Second Appeal is instituted by the defendants in the suit, against the preliminary decree for partition of the suit property into two shares and for allotment of the western moiety to the plaintiff-temple (respondent). There are only three grounds involved in the appeal, of which the first ground alone need detain us at any length. The facts relating to that ground are as follows:

The original owner, Angammal, conveyed this property under Exhibit A-4, dated 19th September, 1938, which is styled as a settlement deed, and which, according to the learned Counsel for the appellants, can by no means be characterised as a testamentary disposition. In the relevant part of this deed, the settlor stipulated the following terms. I am making a free translation here of the Tamil text, which is quoted both by the trial Court and the first appellate Court.

“Venkatasami Naidu (my son) and his male heirs are to take and attain one-half (moiety) of the property. Chinnasami Naidu (my other son) and his male heirs are to similarly take and attain onehalf (moiety) of the property.”

It is not in dispute that the plaintiff temple obtained the rights of Chinnasami Naidu in the property under a sale Exhibit A-3 in its favour. Both the Courts below have applied the principle of section 97 of the Indian Succession Act (XXXIX of 1925) to the interpretation of this settlement deed, and held, following the principle, that the words “male heirs” were not words of limitation, and that Venkata

sami Naidu took a moiety in absolute right, as Chinnasami Naidu similarly did. The result of this would be, of course, that the plaintiff temple (respondent) is entitled to a moiety. Per contra, it is contended by learned Counsel for the defendants (appellants) the alienees from the sons of Chinnasami Naidu as well as from Venkatasami Naidu that technical rules of interpretation with regard to Hindu wills ought not to be applied to other dispositions by Hindus, such as deeds of settlement, particularly in the mofussil. The further argument is that the intentions of the settlor ought to be taken into account, and that an elderly lady like Angammal would not, normally, disinherit her grandsons in that manner, by conveying an absolute interest to her sons. Since she might not be conversant with such technical rules of interpretation of documents, the Courts ought to give effect to her intentions; it is also argued. that the Tamil text might support an interpretation that Chinnasami and his male heirs should simultaneously take equal shares in the property devised to them.

I have carefully considered these arguments, and I find them to be wholly lacking in substance. It is no doubt true that section 97 of the Indian Succession Act enacts a principle of interpretation which, in terms, is applicable to testamentary dispositions, and not to gifts or settlements. But, actually, the principle is one which relates to the Law of Real Property in general, and this is very clear from the following authorities. In Dadabhoy Framji Cama v. Cawasji Dorabji Panday and others’1, the Judicial Committee held that the use of the words “male heirs” in a testament did not import any limitation. That would be so, even in a view most favourable to any alternative interpretation, unless there was some indication of a contrary intention. In Dadhabhai Framji Cama v. Cowasji Dorabji Panday2, Shah, Ag. C.J., and Marten, J., had earlier expressed the same view. This Court has held in Kottapullayya v. Crandhi Veeraraghavamma and another3, that section 97 of the Indian Succession Act lays down a general principle of interpretation of wills, which could equally be applied to a will by a Hindu, unless there was some clear indication of a contrary intention. The two decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the appellants do not impinge upon the crux of the controversy here. In Karuppanna Ambalam v. Tirumalai Ambalam4, Ganapatia Pillai and Venkataraman, JJ., have made some observations with rega