Rule-making power if includes power to prescribe limitation.

This appeal arises out of an application filed under Employees State Insurance Act, 1948. The application was filed under section 75(2) of the Act by the Employees’ State Insurance Corporation, to recover contribution due from the employer, namely the Solar Works, the appellant in this appeal (respondent in the application before the Employees’ Insurance Court, the Principal Judge, City Civil Court, Madras). The application was filed for the recovery of contribution relating to the period between March, 1957, to November, 1958. It was filed on 21st June, 1959. This Act does not prescribe any period of limitation within which such an application could be filed but rule 17 of the Rules framed by the Madras State Government prescribes a period of 12 months from the date on which the cause of action arose or the claim became due. There is a proviso that the Court may entertain an application after the said period of 12 months, if it is satisfied that the applicant had sufficient reason for not making the application within the said period. The Corporation invoked the benefit of this proviso in their application. They stated that they became aware of the liability of the employer only on 16th February, 1959, when the Insurance Inspector inspected the records of the employer.

The employer opposed the claim as barred by limitation and urged that no satisfactory reasons had been adduced under the proviso to rule 17 for excusing the delay.

At the time of the argument on the application before the Employees’ State Insurance Court, it appears to have been contended on behalf of the employer that rule 17 was valid but not the proviso thereto ; ana that under no circumstances could the delay be condoned. On the other hand, it appears to have been contended on behalf of the Corporation that rule 17 itself was ultra vires the State Government because the Act itself did not provide any period of limitation for such an application for contribution and on a true construction of the Act it would follow that the intention of the Legislature was that there could be no period of limitation at all for such an application.

The Employees’ State Insurance Court accepted the contention of the Corporation to a substantial extent, namely, that the Act did not specifically provide for any limitation and that rule 17 was ultra vires of the Act. At the same time it was not prepared to accept the further contention of the Corporation that there would be no limit of time at all for such an application and it held that the period of limitation, would be the same as if a regular suit had been filed in the ordinary civil Court for recovering the contribution. In that view it held that Article 120 of the Limitation Act, would apply and, if so, the claim would be within time. The Court passed this order in a batch of applications and posted the applications for further consideration, on the other points at issue.

The contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant, Sri G. Krishnamurthi Aiyar, is that the Employees’ Insurance Court is wrong in its view that rule 17 is ultra vires the State Government; and he says that the matter must go back in order that the Insurance Court may consider whether there are reasonable grounds for condoning the delay under the proviso to rule 17. The learned Counsel for the appellant does not contend before me that the proviso is invalid as was contended on behalf of the employer before the Insurance Court. As against this, Sri Rangarajan representing the Government Pleader, who appears for the Corporation contends that rule 17 is ultra vires the State Government and that on a true construction of the Act it should be held that no limitation is prescribed at all under the Act. The further question whether Article 120 of the Limitation Act would apply has not been argued before me because it cannot arise. The question is whether rule 17 is valid ; if so the application should go back for consideration whether there are