S. Ramachandra Iyer, C.J.-

This Second Appeal raises a question of some importance as to the construction of section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (which we shall sometimes refer to also as the Act). The facts giving rise to this litigation are not now in dispute. One Somasundara Odayar, a resident of Poongavur village in Thanjavoor Dt., died sometime before the year 1937, leaving him surviving his widow, Sellathachi and two daughters, Kuppammal and Punithavalli Ammal, the last of them being the first respondent to this appeal. The properties left by Somasundara were inherited by his widow and were in her possession on the date when the Act came into force. Punithavalli Ammal was a disappointment to her mother, she having left her husband in the year 1947 to live with her paramour. Disputes even arose between them and Sellathachi had to file a suit in the year 1948 and that successfully to restrain her daughter and her paramour from interfering with the properties in her possession.

While so, the Hindu Succession Act came into force on 14th June, 1956. By virtue of the provisions contained in section 14(1) of the Act, Sellathachi became the absolute owner of the properties which she inherited from her husband.

She then appears to have contemplated taking the appellant in adoption and secured the necessary consent from her husband’s relations for the purpose. Just a few days before the adoption took place, she settled an extent of seven acres and thirty-six cents of land on her elder daughter Kuppammal for her life with a gift over to the son to be adopted. Under the same document an extent of two acres and twenty-eight cents were given to the settlor’s brother. The document also provided that if Punithavalli Ammal were to leave her paramour and reform herself, half of the net income, if Kuppammal was agreeable, from the properties settled on her, might be given to the former for her maintenance. The validity of this document has not now been questioned.

On 13th July, 1956, the appellant was duly taken in adoption by Sellathachi after the performance of the prescribed ceremonies. A deed of adoption was also executed by the adoptive mother on the same day. That unmistakably shows that the executant’s intention then was, that all the properties in her enjoyment should thereafter be taken by the appellant. There were, however, no formal words of conveyance to that effect in the adoption deed.

Some months thereafter, on 19th June, 1957, Sellathachi, who was then ill, executed another settlement, Exhibit B-4, in favour of the first respondent, her erring daughter, giving her an absolute interest in 9 acres and 16 cents of land and a half share in a house. The validity of this settlement was challenged almost immediately by the appellant when Sellathachi was alive by the suit which has given rise to this Second Appeal. The settlor who was impleaded as the first defendant to the action died soon after its institution.

The validity of the settlement deed, Exhibit B-4, was impugned before the Courts below on more than one ground ; but the arguments before us were confined to one point alone namely, the competency of Sellathachi to settle the properties on her daughter after the adoption of the appellant had been made.

The lower Courts have concurrently found that by reason of section 14 (1) of the Act the widow’s estate till then possessed by Sellathachi became an absolute one in her hands, and that the adoption of the appellant subsequent to the coming into force of the Act, would not have the effect of divesting her of the estate and consequently the settlement in favour of the first respondent was validly made.

In our opinion, there appears to have been some misapprehension on the part of the lower Courts in regard to the true construction of section 14 (1) of the Act. What that section enacts is to convert a limited estate which a woman possessed under the law (except in the cases provided by sub-section (2) into an absolute one;

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