Starting point of limitation for filing suit.

This Second Appeal by the plaintiff turns upon the question of limitation. Both the Courts below have agreed and there is no dispute in this Court that Article 116 of the Limitation Act governs the suit. But they have differed as to when time began to run. The lower appellate Court was of the view that the date of the sales in favour of the plaintiff would be the starting point, while the trial Court held that 21st July, 1951, when the plaintiff failed to get a decree declaring his title to the suit property, would be the starting point. I have to decide which of the two views is the correct one.

One Chennimalai was adjudged an insolvent on 25th February, 1933. On 28th August, 1934, the Official Receiver sold to one Pethan Chettiar his right, title and interest in the suit property. Pethan Chettiar got on 14th July, 1937, symbolical delivery of the insolvent’s share purchased by him. The successors-in-interest of Pethan Chettiar sold the suit property to the plaintiff under two sale deeds both dated 20th January, 1949. On the strength of the sales in his favour, the plaintiff instituted O.S. No. 86 of 1949 on the file of the District Munsif’s Court, Karur, to recover possession of the property. His suit, however, was dismissed on 21st July, 1951 and so too his appeal on 12th March, 1954. He brought, therefore, the present suit on 12th March, 1957, for recovery of compensation from the respondents for breach of warranty of title in relation to the suit property. Although there were several defences, the one that survives now is the question of limitation. The lower appellate Court as I said, disagreeing with the decree of the trial Court held that the suit was barred by limitation under Article 116 of the Limitation Act and in that view dismissed the suit.

Sri K.S. Ramamurthi, the learned counsel for the appellant contended before me that having regard to the circumstances of this case, the view of the lower appellate Court that the starting point of limitation was 20th January, 1949, when the sales were executed by the respondents could not be supported. His contention was that Pethan Chettiar having admittedly taken symbolical delivery and the parties to the sales having contemplated that the vendee should take steps to reduce the property to his possession, the breach of the covenant of title should be taken to have occurred on 21st July, 1951, when the plaintiff’s attempt to recover possession failed by a suit therefor being dismissed on that date. On the other hand, Sri K. S. Champakesa Ayyangar urged that the breach occurred even on the date when the sales were executed and that the fact that Pethan Chettiar had taken symbolical possession could make no difference to it.

Article 116 of the Limitation Act governs a suit for compensation for the breach of a contract in writing registered. It cannot be disputed, and in fact it was not disputed as already stated, that this article governs the present suit, the period prescribed by the Article is six years and it begins to run when the period of limitation would begin to run against a suit brought on a similar contract not registered. Article 115 covers a contract of that category and the Third column therein runs:

“When the contract is broken, or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs, or (where the breach is continuing) when it ceases.”

The question, therefore, is when the contract of sale can be said to have been broken or the breach occurred. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, this could be said to have happened not earlier than the date of the decision by the Court of the first instance in O.S. No. 86 of 1949 negativing the right of the plaintiff to recover possession. In support of his contention, my attention was drawn to a number of authorities but it seems to me that it is not necessary to refer to them all. In Subbaraya Reddiar v. Rajagopala Reddiar1Seshagiri Ayyar, J., in relatio