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1961 Supreme(Mad) 345

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Mr. S. Ramachandra Iyer, Chief Justice Mr. Justice swami and Mr. JusticeSrinivasan
K. Perumal Chettiar
Versus
V. Muthuswami
C.R.P. No. 76 of 1961. (3rd Agrahayana, 1883, Saka)
Decided On : 24 November 1961

Advocates:
S. K. Ahmed Meeran and M. Khaja Mohideen, for Petitioner.
P. S. Srisailam, for Respondent.

Dismissal of earlier petition would affect the later.

Headnote:Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act , 1949-Section 7 (6) - Madras Act , 1960-Section 10(7), Proviso---Scope and Effect-Another petition for similar relief filed during pendency of the petition for eviction.

       

Ramachandra Iyer, C.J.-

This Civil Revision Petition has been posted before this Full Bench in view of the challenge made to the correctness of the decision reported in Sita Ramanjaneyulu v. Krishnayya1. The subject matter of this Revision Petition relates to certain proceedings initiated by the respondent-landlord for eviction of the petitioner under the provisions of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (XXV of 1949). Even earlier, that is on 1st February, 1955, the respondent had filed a petition (H.R.C. No. 35 of 1955) for a similar relief before the Rent Controller, Tiruchirappalli, the ground alleged being that the tenant had defaulted in payment of rent and had sub-let the building which according to him was also required for personal occupation. That application was dismissed by the Rent Controller. An appeal from that order proved fruitless. The respondent questioned the correctness of that order under section 12-B of the Act in C.R.P. No. 15 of 1957 on the file of the District Court, Tiruchirappalli, which also met with a similar fate. That was on 30th December, 1958. While the Revision Petition was pending before the District Judge, that is, on 20th August, 1958, the respondent filed H.R.C. No. 283 of 1958 (out of which the Revision Petition before us arises) for eviction of the petitioner on the ground that he was guilty of further default in the payment of rent, in that he was in arrears from 18th February, 1957 to 18th July, 1958, a period subsequent to the filing of the previous petition. Another ground, namely, the need for personal occupation, was also mentioned. The Courts below, have accepted the case of the respondent and ordered eviction. That order is contested before us on the short ground that the filing of the second petition for eviction on the grounds stated, even while the earlier petition for similar reliefs was pending adjudication before the Court of revision, is not authorised by law and that therefore the lower Courts had no jurisdiction to order eviction. The contention is based solely on the terms of section 7 (6) of the Act which runs:

"Where an application under sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) for evicting a tenant has been rejected by the Controller, the tenancy shall subject to the provisions of this Act be deemed to continue on the same terms and conditions as before and shall not be terminated by the landlord except on one or more of the grounds mentioned in sub-section (2) or sub-section (3)."

It is contended that as under the sub-section the tenancy continues on the rejection of an application for eviction, any default committed by the tenant in regard to payment of rent, etc., during the pendency of the petition, will not entitle the landlord to file an application under section 7 of the Act ; to permit him to do so will be to recognise a power in the landlord to terminate the tenancy which on the terms of the statute is deemed to continue. This argument is supported by the decision in Sita Ramanjaneyulu v. Krishnayya1.

We are of opinion that the terms of section 7 (6) do not warrant such a construction. That sub-section specifically states that the tenancy which is deemed to continue thereunder will be terminable by the landlord on the grounds specified in sub-sections (2) and (3). There are no words in the section to prevent the landlord founding a second petition for eviction on the basis of a default in the payment of rent which occurs subsequent to the filing of the first petition. Further, there may also arise cases where subsequent to the earlier petition but during the pendency of it, a need arises for the landlord to obtain the building for personal occupation or there may be cases where the tenant unauthorisedly sub-lets the premises or commits waste or nuisance. It cannot be denied that the landlord must in justice be able to obtain relief in such cases. To say such a right would be lost merely because an ill-founded earlier petition was pending will require m














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