Ganapatia Pillai, J.-

I have already perused the judgment about to be pronounced by my learned brother Venkataraman, J., and, although I entirely agree in the conclusions he has reached, I would like to add a few words of my own on the questions of law raised by Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, counsel for the appellant.

Three main contentions were urged by him. The first related to the applicability of section 14.(1) of the Hindu Succession Act of 1956 to this case. Itconsisted of two parts, the first part factual and the other part legal. The factual part consisted in the argument that the possession of the estate by the second defendant amounted to alienation of the properties by the widows and consequently the widows should be held to be not in possession of the estate when alone the operation of section 14 (1) of the Act would be attracted. That argument has been dealt with fully by my learned brother and I do not propose to add anything more to what he has said. I agree with him that the possession of the estate, either moveable or immoveable by the second defendant does not amount to alienation of it by the widows as he occupies the position of an agent of the widows or one of them.

The other aspect of the question is not now open having regard to the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Katturuswami v. Veeravva1. The true interpretation of the word “ possession” occurring in section 14 (1) which commended itself to Rajagopalan, O.C J., and Rajagopala Ayyangar, J., in Appeal No. 423 bf 1946, viz., that the expression does not connote possession as distinct from title in a way receives confirmation from the decision of the Supreme Court in Katturuswami’s case1. However, I doubt whether the requirement as to possession in the section qualifies only estates acquired by a Hindu female before the commencement of the Act. In none of the decisions so far available on this topic has this distinction been brought out. It may be material to point out this distinction though it does not affect the disposal of the appeal now before us. Cases may arise where a Hindu female acquires property after the commencement of the Act but does not get possession of it at once. In which event, the distinction may become relevant to find out whether the enlargement of the limited estate into a full estate takes effect from the date of the acquisition or after possession also is acquired by the female. I do not expatiate further upon this point because the question does not arise for our consideration in this appeal and possibily the decision in Appeal No. 423 of 1946 cited above may furnish the answer.

The second argument of Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar was that this case should be governed by section 14 (2) of the Act. The nature of a transaction of partition between cb-owners like widows has been sufficiently explained by leading decisions which have been referred to by my learned brother in his judgment. It is enough to say that in a transaction of partition between co-owners like co-widows, there is no element of transfer of property but only an element of relinquishment of interest in property. Consequently I agree with my learned brother that the partition in this case would not amount to any kind of transaction covered by section 14. (2) of the Act.

The third question which is the substantial question argued by Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar related to the effect of section 8 of the Act in cases where a widow had already succeeded to the estate of a deceased Hindu male who had died intestate before the Act came into force. His cpntention was that every case where a Hindu male dies intestate leaving a female heir to succeed him like widow or daughter succession to the estate of the male does not really open until the death of the intervening female heir when alone it would be possible to ascertain who would be the persons entitled to take the estate as reversioners. That principle of Hindu Law has been relied upon for applying the provisions of the Hindu Law

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