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1960 Supreme(Mad) 234

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Mr. P. V. Rajamannar, Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Veeraswami
Globe Theatre Private Ltd., having its registered office at Bombay and its Branch Office at Madras
Versus
The State of Madras represented by Deputy Secretary to Government, Home Department, Madras
W.A. No. 107 of 1960. (27th Sravana, 1882-Saka)
Decided On : 18 August 1960

Advocates:
K. Rajah Iyer and K. S. Ramamurthi, for Appellant.
Respondent not represented.

Scope of exemption under section 13.

Headnote:Madras Buildings (Least and Rent Control) Act, 1949-Section 13 - Exemption-Scope of.

       

Rajamannar, C.J.-

This is an appeal from the Judgment of Rajagopalan, J., in Writ Petition No. 465 of 1960 filed by the Appellant for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the order of the Government in G.O. Ms. No. 351, dated 3rd February, 1960. It is sufficient to state the following facts. The second respondent, who is the contesting respondent, obtained a lease of a site in Mount Road, Madras, and constructed a Cinema Theatre known as the New Globe Theatre. He leased the theatre to the appellant before us in 19421. Subsequently the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act came into force. In March, 1959, the second respondent applied to the Government to exempt the theatre from the provisions of the Rent Control Act of 1949, The appellant before us opposed the grant of exemption and made his representations. Eventually the Government passed the order above referred to and exempted the premises from the operation of section 7 of the Act, that is the section relating to eviction.

The validity of the impugned order was attacked on several grounds. The first and most substantial ground was that section 13 of the Act under which the Government purported to pass the order of exemption was itself ultra vires and, therefore, the Government had no jurisdiction to act under that section. Unfortunately for the appellant this question is concluded so far as this Court is concerned by a decision of a Division Bench to which one of us was a party in Globe Theatres Ltd. v. State of Madras1Following the decision Rajagopalan, J., held that section 13 of the Act was valid, We shall now briefly mention the other ground which also did not find acceptance with Rajagopalan, J., who dismissed the petition. It is contended that the Government in passing the order in question were really adding another ground for eviction to the grounds set out in section 7 of the Act. That they could not do, because of the principle laid down in a decision of this Court in Abdul Subhan Sahib & Sons v. State of Madras2 . We confess that there are here and there certain observations in this case which might appear to support this argument. But when examined carefully it will be evident that it was not the intention of the Division Bench to lay down a general proposition that the exemption could be granted only on grounds contained in the Act as valid grounds for eviction. Indeed the contrary was laid down in the leading decision in The Globe Theatres v. State of Madras1namely, that if a ground is actually covered by any provision of the Act, then resort must be had to the Tribunals established under the Act, and if a party has failed in his attempts to get relief from such Tribunals it would not be open to the Government to give him relief on the same ground. In a later decision, the same Division Bench which decided Abdul Subhan Sahib &38; Sons v. State of Madras2, explained the decision in Chinniah Servai v. State of Madras3 . We agree on this point with Rajagopalan J’s. summary which he quotes from an earlier decision of his:

“It should therefore be taken as well settled now that the grant of exemption is not vitiated merely because it may result in eviction on grounds other than those specified in section 7 of the Act. It should be obvious that, if the desired eviction could be secured under the terms of the Act itself, there should be no occasion at all to grant any exemption from the operation of the Act. The exemption is not a substitute for a relief permissible under the Act itself.”

We may point out in this connection that it would be wrong to say that by reason of the exemption the Government are adding a new ground for eviction. Actually what happens on an exemption is that the ordinary law of the land applies, namely, the Transfer of Property Act, and the parties are governed by the provisions of that Act. There is no substance in this ground.

Nor do we find any merits in the contention that the Government had not made a proper enquiry in respect




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