Maintainability of writ of certiorari filed against on administrative order.

The administration of the Annural Muhammadeeya, Madras Trust was governed by a Scheme sanctioned by the High Court by its decree dated 16th April, 1956, in A. S. No. 235 of 1952. The Scheme provided for six trustees. The three petitioners and respondents 8, 9 and 10 were the trustees appointed under the Scheme. The trust constituted a wakf now governed by the provisions of the Muslim Wakfs Act, 1954 (Act XXIX of 1954).

Respondents 1 to 7 sought and obtained the sanction of the Advocate-General under section 92, Civil Procedure Code, to file a suit to amend the Scheme now in force for the administration of the trust. That sanction was accorded on 9th December, 1959, after the Muslim Wakfs Act, 1954, to which I shall hereafter refer as the Act, came into force. Section 55 of the Act provided:

“(1) A suit to obtain any of the reliefs mentioned in section 14 of the Religious Endowments Act, 1863 (XX of 1863) and in section 93 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908), relating to any wakf may, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in those Acts, be instituted by the Board without obtaining the leave or consent referred to in those Acts.

(2) No suit to obtain any of the reliefs referred to in sub-section (1) relating to a wakf shall be instituted by any person or authority other than the Board without the consent in writing of the Board.”

(Proviso omitted).

Respondents 1 to 7 therefore applied to the Board constituted under the Act, impleaded as the 11th respondent in these proceedings, for obtaining the consent prescribed by section 55 (2). The 8th respondent M.S. Abdul Majid, who was one of the trustees appointed under the Scheme was also a member of the Wakf Board Notice of the application prescented by respondents 1 to 7 under section 55 (2) of the Act was given to the trustees including the petitioners. It was the petitioners that opposed the grant of the sanction sought by respondents 1 to 7.

On 19th December, 1959, when the application preferred by respondents 1 to 7 under section 55 (2) of the Act came up before the Board, the eighth respondent as a member of the Board, participated in the proceedings. But nothing was done’ that day except to adjourn the proceedings to 16th January, 1960, to enable the petitioners to file their counter-statement to the application preferred by respondents 1 to 7 The Board enquired into the petition on 16th January, 1960 and again on 30th January, 1960. In these proceedings the eighth respondent did not participate. The petitioner, however, alleged that the eighth respondent was present in the same room on the other side of a screen, and while he was there some of the members of the Board met and talked to him On 1st February, 1960, the petitioners challenged the validity of the proceedings before the Board on the plea that the eighth respondent who was one of the trustees had participated in the proceedings of the Board On 27th February, 1960, the Board accorded the sanction sought by respondents 1 to 7 by a written order. The eighth respondent was not a party to that order It was signed only by the other nine members of the Board.

The petitioners applied under Article 226 of the Constitution for the issue of a writ of certiorari to set aside the order of the Board dated 27th February 1960 giving the sanction sought under section 55 (2) of the Act by respondents 1 to 7.

The learned counsel for the petitioners challenged the validity of the sanction accorded by the Board on 27th February, 1960, on the following grounds. (1) The eighth respondent’s participation in the proceedings invalidated the proceedings and the sanction. The Board violated the principle that no one should be a judge in his own case. It was corannon judice. (2) The second respondent’s presence on the premises and in the same room on 16th January, 1960, 30th January, 1960 and 1st February, 1960, with the other members of the Board having access to him vitiated the ultimate decision of the Board (3) T