Scope of interference in appeal against order of acquittal.

These are appeals preferred by the State against the acquittals of the Respondent in two related cases, in which the facts are identical, but the periods of time concerned are different. In both these cases, the Inspector of Provident Funds, Coimbatore, prosecuted Messrs. Kaleeswarar Mills, Ltd., Coimbatore, the first accused, and the present Respondent, the General Manager of the Mills, the second accused, for an alleged offence under section 14 (2) of the Employees’ Provident Funds Act (XIX of 1952) read with paragraph 76 of the Employees’ Provident Fund Scheme, 1952. What has subsequently happened is that the prosecution was withdrawn as against the first accused (Messrs. Kaleeswarar Mills, Ltd.), and it survived only as against the Respondent. After proceedings into the facts in great detail, the learned Additional First Class Magistrate of Coimbatore held that the Respondent was saved by virtue of the Proviso to section 14-A of the Act which is in the following terms:

“Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any such person liable to any punishment, if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge, or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence.”

The State pleads that the Respondent did not satisfy the terms of this Proviso, and that, hence, upon the admitted facts of the record, he ought to have been convicted. The learned Public Prosecutor urges that the admitted facts and that Kaleeswarar Mills, Ltd., did make deductions from the wages bills of its employees during the relevant periods, and thus it withheld a large sum representing the contribution of the employees to the provident fund. Under the Act, the Mill was bound to make a similar contribution itself, and the failure to do this is an offence under rule 76 (a) of the Employees’ Provident Fund Scheme, 1952. It is strenuously contended that this really amounts to a kind of breach of trust, by which both the Mills and the General Manager (Respondent) are liable, within the terminology of section 14-A (1). On this ground, the acquittal is impugned as wrongful and opposed to law.

Sri V.T. Rangaswami Iyengar for the Respondent raises a plea that the Mills having been exonerated in these proceedings, or the prosecution of the Mills withdrawn, the liability of a person like the Respondent (General Manager) does hot separately survive, since the Mills or the concern is the party mainly liable under section 14-A. There is something to be said for this view, for a reading of section 14-A makes it clear that the company or organisation is made liable for the offences as a juristic person. But it is not really necessary for me to furnish an interpretation of this section, in this context. The real question is whether it is now, expedeient, or essential in the interests of justice, that the acquittal of the Respondent should be interfered with.

I find from a perusal of the judgment of the learned Magistrate, that he has made an exhaustive analysis of the facts with reference to the Proviso relied on by the Respondent. The learned Magistrate seems to believe that the Respondent strained every nerve to save the Mills as a going concern, including running hazards himself in order to provide credit, and that the situation deteriorated to such an extent that the Respondent was quite unable to make any provision for the provident fund contribution of the employer. Other and more urgent demands had to be be met, and it was the collapse of the company, financially speaking, which led to the inability. It seems to me that the facts do justify the inference that the Respondent has tried very hard to save the company. Even if I were inclined to take a somewhat different view of the facts, it will still entirely be a question of fact whether the test laid down by the Proviso has been fulfilled in an individual case.

I am therefore very clear that there is no substantial or compelling reason for interfering