The employer of Murugan Transports, Cuddalore, has filed this petition challenging the Order of the Authority appointed under section 20 (2) of the Minimum Wages Act (Central Act XI of 1948) directing payment of Rs. 693 and Rs. 422 respectively to respondents 1 and 2 who were employed in the Transport service conducted by the former. Radhakrishnan and Chinnathambi were taken from July, 1954 and November, 1955, as cleaner and learner apprentices by the employer. Their services were terminated in July, 1957. On 19th July, 1958, respondents 1 and 2 along with one other employee applied to the Authority appointed under section 20 (2) of the Minimum Wages Act for payment of certain sums of moneys as representing the difference between the minimum wages payable under the notification of the Government contained in G.O. M,. No. 1247 (Industries, Labour and Co-operation) dated 30th March, 1957, and the actual wages paid to them.

The employer contested the claim on three grounds, namely (1) that a petition under section 20 (2) of the Minimum Wages Act could not be entertained by the Authority at the instance of a discharged employee; (2) that the claim was barred by limitation and (3) that the claim was excessive. Overruling the objection; the Authority appointed under the Minimum Wages Act allowed the claim of respondents 1 and a for the sums mentioned above and directed the emloyer to pay the same. The validity of that order is questioned in this petition on the identical grounds that were taken before the Authority.

It is contended on behalf of the employer that an employee who seeks relief under section 20 of the Minimum Wages Act must be one coming within the definition contained in section 2 (k) of the Act, namely one who is in actual employment, and that a discharged employee would have no right to take advantage of the summary procedure prescribed under section 20 of the Act albeit he might have a remedy under the general law.

Section 20 (2) enables an employee to apply to the Authority appointed under sub-section (1) for a direction as to payment to the employee of the amount by which the minimum wages fixed under the Act exceeded the amount actually paid. The term ‘employee’ is defined in section 2 (i) “as any person who is employed for hire or reward to do any work” (The rest of the section is omitted as unnecessary). The contention urged on behalf of the employer is that on a strict application of the definition of the term contained in section 2 (i) the employee who would be entitled to apply to the Authority appointed under section 20 should be one who is actually employed at the time the application was filed and not one who had ceased to be employed.

This contention is supported by the decision in Wakefield Estate v. Perumal1, of Balakrishna Ayyar, J., wherein the learned Judge held that having regard to the definition of the term “employee” under section 2 (i) of the Minimum Wages Act, past employees would not be entitled to obtain the benefit of the summary remedy provided by section 20 of the Minimum Wages Act. This view of the learned Judge was mainly based on the circumstances that section 2 (i) while defining the term “employee” described him as a person “who is employed”. The learned Judge also adverted to the fact that wherever a statute intended to include past employees suitable words were used, and from the omission of those words, the legitimate conclusion should be that past employees were not intended to be benefited by the terms of that section.

The interpretation of section 20 which commended itself to the learned Judge will have the effect of excluding a large class of employees from the remedy provided by that section. Section 3 of the Act empowers the appropriate Government to fix the minimum rate of wages in regard to employments specified in the Schedule to the Act. A reference to the Schedule would show that minimum wages were intended to be fixed not merely for permanent workers but to casual