I entirely agree with the observations of my learned brother enunciating pellucidly, if I may respectfully say so, the scope of section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act and its due place in criminal trials. On account of the importance of the topic, I would like to add the following:

This section should be applied with care and caution in criminal cases. But it cannot be said that it has no application to criminal cases: B. N. Chatterji v. Dinesh Chandra Guba1. See Woodroffe and Ameer Ali’s Law of Evidence in India, Tenth Edition, by Malik, C.J., (1958), Volume II, page 1260 — Applicability to Criminal Cases.

The ordinary rule which applies to criminal trials in this country that the onus lies on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused is not in any way modified by the provisions contained in section 106 of the Evidence Act. This section is on the other hand to be taken along with the provisions of that general rule: Lachman Singh v. The King2, Shambunath v. State of Ajmer3, Shewaram Jethanand v. Emperor4. In the language of Professor Glanville Williams, this persuasive burden of proof (as opposed to the evidential burden envisaged in section 106) namely, the