The plaintiff is the Appellant. He brought the suit for specific performance of an alleged contract to sell the building belonging to the respondent. The respondent is a co-operative society.

The case for the plaintiff is this. In the end of January, 1956, the defendant-society called for offers for the sale of the house. There were offers up to Rs. 2,500. The plaintiff gave a petition for purchase of R. 2,550. The Board, by its resolution No. 391, dated 3rd September, 1956, accepted the plaintiff’s offer and authorised a sale-deed to be executed by the President if the sale could be concluded before 2nd March, 1956. The plaintiff was informed by the President of this resolution and subsequently he was told that a draft sale-deed might be submitted after Mahamaham, that is to say, by about 7th March, 1956. Accordingly the plaintiff submitted a draft sale-deed, but the defendant did not sell the house because the sale was not completed before 2nd March, 1956, according to the resolution. This answer of the defendant was also embodied in a resolution, dated 5th March, 1956. It may be mentioned that it was only after this resolution that the plaintiff sent a draft. The defendant admitted the offer made by the plaintiff and also the first resolution passed by the Society and the fact that the President informed the plaintiff of the resolution and added that the plaintiff agreed to the time-limit and, as he did not keep to the time-limits, the subsequent resolution was passed. The defendant denied that there was any mention to the plaintiff that the draft might be submitted by 7th March, 1956. On these facts, issues were framed as follows:

(1) Was there any stipulation as to the time for plaintiff’s fulfilling the contract and, if so was time essence of the contract ?

(2) Was there a completed contract in law?

Two other issues also were framed which are not necessary for the purpose of the contentions before me in Second Appeal. The first Court decreed the suit, but in appeal the District Judge dismissed the suit. Hence this Second Appeal by the plaintiff.

The appellate Court went on the footing that time was of the essence of the contract and as the plaintiff, knowing the terms of the resolution, did not conform himself to those terms, he could not be allowed specific performance. As regards the communication, in paragraph 8 of his judgment, the learned District Judge observed:

“ It was the duty of the plaintiff to obtain the Board’s resolution in writing accepting his offer as per Exhibit B-2 and the terms of the resolution. He cannot for one purpose rely on the resolution and for another purpose escape from its terms.”

In paragraph 10 he says:

“ There is nothing to show that plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract within the time limit. In fact, he appears to have taken it leisurely on some alleged assurance by the President, that is hardly worth any credence.”

In paragraph 12 he held that there was no completed contract and that, in any event, time was of the essence of the contract and therefore he found the points in favour of the defendant and dismissed the suit.

In appeal before me, the main contention of the appellant was that time was not of the essence of the contract. If the case has to be decided only on that point, I must agree with the contention of the appellant that in this case time cannot be said to be of the essence of the contract. I have only to refer to the decision in Jamshed Khodaram v. Burjorji Dhunijbhai1, to hold that in such a case of sales of land, that is of immovable property, time is not normally to be considered as essence of the contract.

But by far the most important question that appears to me and on which the learned counsel for the respondent relies is whether there has been a completed contract, that is to say, whether there has been a communication of the resolution passed by the society to the plaintiff? The plaintiff states in his evidence that

“no information w