Grant of injunction by the Revenue Divisional Officer during pendency of proceedings.

This revision petition raises the question whether a Revenue Divisional Officer exercising the powers granted to him under Madras Act XXV of 1955 would be entitled to grant an order of injunction pending proceedings initiated under section 3 (3) (a) of that Act.

The respondent claiming to be a cultivating tenant deposited the rent under section 3 (3) (a) of the Act and while proceedings under clause (b) of that sub-section were pending applied to the Revenue Divisional Officer for an injunction to restrain the landlord and certain others claiming to be purchasers from him from interfering with his possession. The Officer granted the injunction prayed for and the jurisdiction of the Officer to do so is challenged in the Civil Revision Petition.

An injunction is a remedy which is preventive in its nature, that is a remedy before any injury is sustained, i.e., when there is only a threat of an injury. It is now accepted by the decisions of this Court that except in cases where this Court issues an injunction by virtue of its inherent powers as a Court of Record, the subordinate Courts would have no power to issue orders of injunction beyond what is expressly conferred on them by the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 94 of the Civil Procedure Code states that in order to prevent the ends of justice from being defeated the Court may if it is so prescribed, grant a temporary injunction, and in case of disobedience, commit the person guilty thereof to the civil prison and order that his property be attached and sold. The expression “ if it is so prescribed” obviously refers to Order 39, rules 1 and 2 of the Code. Therefore, it will follow that Courts to which the Code of Civil Procedure applies would have powers to grant a temporary injunction in accordance with Order 39, rules 1 and 2, and there would be no scope for implying any inherent power in any one of such Courts. An injunction is a specific relief and the jurisdiction to grant it should be conferred by statute. Now the question in the present case is whether the Revenue Court acting under Act XXV of 1955 will have power to grant an injunction. The Code of Civil Procedure does not wholly apply to that Court. It has therefore to be seen whether, on the terms of the provisions contained in Act XXV of 1955, such a power exists in that Court. It is needless to point out that a power to grant an injunction cannot be assumed to exist by any implication of law. The reason is that ordinarily it is the civil Court that will have the jurisdiction to grant an injunction. When a statutory tribunal ousts the jurisdiction of the civil Court in regard to certain matters, it has got to be seen whether the powers of the civil Court in regard to injunction, etc., have been abrogated and those powers have been expressly conferred on the special tribunal. It is therefore necessary to examine the provisions of Madras Act XXV of 1955 to ascertain whether there is such a power.

Section 3 (1) of the Act declares that a cultivating tenant shall not be evicted from his holding or any part thereof except at the instance of the landlord and except in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Sub-section (2) provides the cases which would be exempted from operation of the prohibition contained in section 3 (1). Sub-section (3) (a) enables the cultivating tenant to deposit the rent payable in the Revenue Court and clause (b) of that sub-section provides for the determination as to the sufficiency or otherwise of the rent deposited. Sub-section (4) provides for the eviction of tenants. Section 4 declares the right of a tenant who had been dispossessed for being restored back to possession. It is unnecessary to refer to sections 4-A and 5. Section 6 bars the jurisdiction of the civil Court in regard to matters -which the Revenue Divisional Officer is empowered under the Act to determine. Section 6-A directs that certain suits for possession or injunction instituted by the landlord against a cultivat