This is an appeal against the decree for dissolution and taking of accounts of the partnership passed by the Subordinate Judge of Devakottai, in O.S. No. 104 of 1949. The defendant is the appellant.

Viswanathan Chettiar and Muthuraman Chettiar, who were two divided brothers, carried on money-lending business in partnership at Minhby, Rangoon and Dedaya. The former two businesses were ultimately dissolved and the assets integrated with the Dedaya firm. Muthuraman Chettiar died first, i.e., on 13th April, 1926, leaving his widow, the respondent as his sole heir. The business, however, continued. The respondent thereupon stepped into the shoes of her deceased husband and carried on business with Viswanathan Chettiar. Exhibit B-70 is a deed of partnership dated 10th December, 1941, entered into between the respondent and Viswanathan Chettiar, the defendant’s adoptive father. There is no doubt that the partnership between them was from the date of death of Muthuraman Chettiar in continuation of the old business and this document was only a record of the terms thereof for reducing the rate of income-tax. On 19th November, 1943, Viswanathan Chettiar died. About one year prior to his death, the appellant was adopted to him. Even after the death of Viswanathan Chettiar the business continued as before. The appellant stepped into the shoes of his adoptive father, Viswanatha. On 28th August, 1946, the appellant and the respondent reduced the terms of their partnership to writing, viz., Exhibit B-71, defining their rights. This document again was mainly for the purpose of income-tax as Exhibit B-71 itself acknowledged that the partnership business was in existence sometime previously. On 23rd February, 1949, the respondent gave a notice for dissolution of the firm calling upon the appellant to render accounts. The appellant had no objection to the dissolution of the Dedaya firm but was willing to the taking of accounts only for the period in which he had been in the business. The suit out of which this appeal arises was filed on 27th July, 1949.

Various defences were raised by the appellant in answer to the claim of the respondent. It is unnecessary to refer to them as the question that was argued before me in the appeal related only to the mode of taking of the accounts. The lower Court found that the firms at Minhbyu and Rangoon were dissolved and their assets taken over to the Dedaya firm. It also found that the partnership business ever since the time of Muthuraman and Viswanathan which was done with the help of agents was done without a break and that Exhibits B-70 and B-71 could not be understood as creating new partnerships. The lower Court further held that the respondent would not be entitled to an account prior to the death of her husband Muthuraman, that is prior to 13th April, 1926, but that she would have a right to the taking of the accounts from 13th April, 1926. The lower Court made it also clear that while taking accounts it may be open to the parties to look into the old accounts, i.e., accounts prior to 13th April, 1926, for the purpose of ascertaining the capital contribution. It accordingly passed a preliminary decree for taking accounts of the dissolved partnership on the lines indicated by it. The defendant has filed the present appeal against that decree.

Mr. Jagadisa Iyer, the learned counsel for the appellant, did not contest the findings of the lower Court as to matters other than its direction in regard to the accounts. His contention was that on the death of Muthuraman, the partnership between him and Viswanatha came to an end and there was a fresh partnership between the respondent and Viswanatha from 1926 to 1943, when the latter died, and that on the death of Viwanatha that firm was dissolved and the partnership business carried on by the appellant with the respondent subsequently could only be treated as a separate partnership. He, therefore, contended that the respondent would be entitled to an acc