This is an application for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash an order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal in the following circumstances:

The petitioner was employed under the first respondent who was the owner of a coffee estate. The duties of the petitioner consisted in driving a tractor. At the time of his appointment, he was notified that he should not permit any other person to travel in the tractor or in any machinery attached to the tractor and that such conduct on his part would entail dismissal. On the 1st April, 1954, the petitioner was charged by the Management with having knowingly permitted one Natesan to ride on a tiller attached to the tractor. The petitioner denied the charge and stated that if Natesan was on the machine it was without his knowledge. There was an enquiry in consequence of this denial and at that enquiry it was proved that it was with the petitioner’s knowledge that Natesan rode on the tiller. On the ground of misconduct involved in this act, the Management dismissed the petitioner from service. The rules of service of the petitioner provided an appeal to a higher authority within the Management itself. The petitioner availed himself of this further remedy but did not succeed. Thereupon, the Union, of which the petitioner was a member, started a dispute challenging the justness of the petitioner’s dismissal from service. As it was not possible toeffect a conciliation of this dispute, the matter was taken up to the Government who referred the dispute to adjudication under section 10(1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Before the Industrial Tribunal, the Union put forward two contentions. The first was that the dismissal was not bona fide in that it involved an unfair labour practice as also that it was the result of victimisation of the petitioner; and secondly, they pleaded that as a fact Natesan was carried on the tiller by the petitioner without his knowledge. Evidence was taken by the Tribunal and as a result, it negatived the allegations regarding unfair labour practice as well as victimisation. It also found that the charge made against the petitioner was well-founded. The question that then remained for consideration was as regards the justness of the punishment awarded by the employer. As regards this, the Tribunal, after citing a number of decisions, came to the conclusion that the punishment of dismissal was too harsh and was not justified by the circumstances, and substituted for the punishment inflicted by the employer one of suspension for a period of six months without pay.

The employer, the first respondent here, took the matter in appeal to the Labour Appellate Tribunal. Before this Appellate Authority, the Union raised the preliminary objection that no appeal lay to the Tribunal under section 7(1)(a) of the Labour Appellate Tribunal Act for the reason that no substantial question of law was involved in the appeal. The Tribunal overruled this objection and after discussing the evidence in the case reached the same conclusion as the Tribunal as regards the charge being proved and also as regards the mala fides of the employer. The Appellate Authority, however, held that there was no justification for interfering with the order of dismissal passed by the employer, and differing in that respect from the Industrial Tribunal, modified its order and gave as its answer that the dismissal of the employee was justified. It is this order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal that is challenged before me as being beyond its jurisdiction.

The learned counsel for the petitioner-workman urged that the Appellate Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal or to interfere with the order of the Industrial Tribunal, as no substantial question of law was involved in the appeal, and on this ground, it was stated that the Labour Appellate Tribunal had exceeded its jurisdiction in judging the severity of the punishment and that in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was