Rajamannar, C.J.- This appeal raises an interesting question of law which we think can be answered by a reference to the principle of the Full Bench decision in Ayyappa v. Kasiperumal1. The question is whether a creditor who has obtained a decree against a debtor whose property has been sold in execution of a decree obtained by another creditor can apply to have the sale set aside under Order 21, rule 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Of course, if the applicant is not only the holder of another decree but also had applied for rateable distribution of assets or taken steps which would entitle him to such a rateable distribution, then he would have the right to apply; but in the present case admittedly the decree-holder who is the appellant before us, has not taken any step in execution. He will not therefore be a person entitled to share in the rateable distribution of assets. Then it only remains to consider whether he can be said to be a person whose interests are affected by the sale. The words are indeed very wide, and, on a literal construction of the words, not only decree-holders but even ordinary creditors who have not yet sought to enforce their claims can be said to be affected by the sale of any of the properties of their debtor. Indeed any one who has a prospective claim which can be satisfied by a sale of the properties of a person against whom he has the claim can be said to be a person whose interests are affected by the sale of such property. We have no hesitation in holding that this wide construction was not contemplated by the words. The interests which are alleged to be affected by the sale should be interests which are directly and immediately to be affected and not interests which may hypothetically and remotely be affected by the sale. It is on this principle that the decision of the Full Bench in Ayyappa v. Kasiperumal1, was based. In that case a person who had obtained an attachment before judgment was held to be a person whose interests were affected within the meaning of Order 21, rule 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure, when the property attached had been sold in execution of a decree obtained by another person. One of the points which was decided by the Full Bench was that the expression “interests” can not be confined to interest in the property but would comprise any kind of pecuniary benefit that the appellant is likely to have derived, if the sale had not taken place. To this extent the learned Judges of the Full Bench overruled the decision of a Division Bench in Kathiresan Chettiar v. Ramaswami Chettiar2, which was founded on the view that “interests” referred to interests in the property sold. It may be mentioned that the actual decision in Kathiresan Chettiar v. Ramaswami Chettiar2, is quite in consonance with the ruling of the Full Bench because the appellant in that case was a mere decree-holder who was not entitled to rateable distribution and, therefore, he was not entitled to apply. The learned Chief Justice who delivered the judgment of the Full Bench after referring to the decision in Narayanan v. Pappayi3, observed thus:

“The learned Judge (Srinivasa Ayyangar, J.), in Narayanan v. Pappayi3, considered that the Legislature intended to confer the right to apply on any one who is directly and immediately affected by the sale and with this opinion I am in entire agreement.”

Applying this test, the learned Chief Justice held that a plaintiff who had obtained an attachment before judgment was directly and immediately affected in such circumstances by a sale of the property attached and, therefore, he is within the rule. The fact that he had not obtained a decree at the time he filed the application did not make any difference. Can it be said that a mere decree-holder who has not attached any particular property of the judgment-debtor is directly and immediately interested in the sale of any of the properties of the judgment-debtor ? Evidently not. The decision of Stodart, J., in Govindasami

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