Applicability of bar of suit u/s 32.

The plaintiff in O.S. No. 290 of 1953 on the file of the District Munsif, Ranipet, is the appellant in this Second Appeal.

The suit was for specific performance of a contract of sale entered into by the defendant-respondent and for possession of the property agreed to be conveyed. The plaintiff alleged that on 25th December, 1949, he and the defendant entered into an agreement that, in consideration of the plaintiff giving up certain debts owing to him by the defendant and his father, and the plaintiff conveying to the defendant a half share in a site, the defendant would convey the suit property to the plaintiff by a registered sale deed before 12th June, 1950.

The defendant denied the alleged agreement. He pleaded that the plaintiff had taken his signature fraudulently on some documents.

During trial, the agreement alleged in the plaint was sought to be proved by filing the arbitration agreement, Exhibit A-1, a decision or award by some of the arbitrators, Exhibit A-1 (a) and the endorsement made on that decision by the plaintiff and the defendant.

The learned District Munsif found that the defendant’s signatures which appeared in the abitration agreement and in the endorsement made on the award were taken under duress, without disclosing to him the contents of those documents. The District Munsif held that the agreement set up in the plaint was neither true nor valid and dismissed the suit.

In appeal, the learned District Judge held that it was not necessary to go into the question whether the signatures of the respondent appearing in the arbitration agreement and in the endorsement on the award had been taken in circumstances of duress and fraud. Issue 4 framed in the suit was, whether the suit as framed was maintainable? That was the only issue which, according to the learned Judge, needed consideration. He said that, even assuming that the arbitration agreement and the award were valid and binding on both parties, the suit was barred by section 32 of the Indian Arbitration Act. For that proposition, he relied on Moolchand Jothajee v. Rashid Jamshed Sons and Co1. It was strenuously urged before him that the plaintiff was not seeking relief on the basis of the arbitration agreement, or the award and that the relief sought was enforcement of the agreement that had been endorsed on the decision or the award. In regard to that argument, namely, that the endorsement made on the " award " formed a separate, enforceable contract, which was not hit at by the provisions of section 32, the learned Judge said that the endorsement created no independent rights or obligations and that any attempt to enforce that endorsement would necessarily bring into question the existence of the award, the terms of the award and their validity, and that an investigation of those questions was barred by section 32 of the Indian Arbitration Act. In that view, the learned appellate Judge held that the suit was not maintainable and dismissed the appeal.

The point for determination is whether the suit is barred under section 32 of the Indian Arbitration Act.

Section 32 of the Arbitration Act enacts:

" Notwithstanding any law for the time being in force, no suit shall lie on any ground whatsoever for a decision upon the existence, effect or validity of an arbitration agreement or award."

Section 2 (a) of the Act states that an award means an arbitration award. To ascertain what an arbitration award is, we should turn to section 14 of the Act. It says:

" (1) where the arbitrators or umpire have made their award, they shall sign it and shall give notice in writing to the parties of the making and signing thereof...... (2) The arbitrators or umpire shall, at the request of any party to the arbitration agreement or any person claiming under such party or if so directed by the Court and upon payment of the fees and charges due in respect of the arbitration and award and of the costs and charges of filing the award, cause the award or a signed copy of it, toget