Balakrishna Ayyar, J.—In May, 1955 the accused was the Deputy Post Master, Erode. On the charge that he had on 8th May, 1955, accepted a bribe of Rs. 25 from P.W.1, the accused was prosecuted under section 161, Indian Penal Code and section 5 (1) (d) read with section 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.

The case was first heard by Mr. Krishnan Nambudripad, the then Special Judge of Coimbatore. He examined P.Ws.1 to 8 and questioned the accused under section 342, Criminal Procedure Code. Thereafter P.Ws.1 to 4 and 6 and 7 were further cross-examined. At this stage Mr. Krishnan Nambudripad was transferred and he was succeeded by Mr. Manjapra Balakrishna Menon. When he took up the case — that was on 27th August, 1956 — the accused filed an application purporting to be under section 350, Criminal Procedure Code, praying that the prosecution witnesses be re-summoned and re-heard. The application was opposed by the Public Prosecutor. The Special Judge dismissed the application. Thereafter he concluded the trial and convicted the accused and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for six months.

During the arguments in the appeal which the accused preferred Mr. V.T. Rangaswami Ayyangar, his learned advocate, raised the point that the failure of the Special Judge to grant the application of the accused vitiated the entire proceedings and that for that reason the conviction was bad.

In view of the conflict of decisions on this point between In re Vaidyanatha1 and Gopal Prasad v. State2 the learned Judge who was hearing the appeal referred the matter to a Bench which in its turn referred it to a Full Bench.

The question we have to decide may be thus formulated. Is section 350, Criminal Procedure Code, part of the procedural law applicable to the trial of an accused person by a Special Judge appointed under the provisions of (Central) Act XLVI of 1952?

It may be explained at once that before it was amended in 1955, section 350, Criminal Procedure Code, conferred on an accused person, who was being tried by a Magistrate, the right to demand that the witnesses be resummoned and reheard,

“Whenever any Magistrate, after having heard and recorded the whole or any part of the evidence in any inquiry or a trial, ceases to exercise jurisdiction therein, and is succeeded by another Magistrate”.

This right of his was absolute and unqualified. The amendment made in 1955 considerably cut down that right. The accused lost his right to insist, as a matter of course, that any witness should be resummoned and reheard. It was left to the discretion of the Magistrate to decide whether it was necessary in the interests of justice to resummon and rehear any witness.

The Special Judges who tried this case functioned under Central Act XLVI of 1952. It is as well to analyse the main features of that Act. The preamble recites that it was enacted to provide for the more speedy trial of certain offences. These offences include those punishable under sections 161, 165 and 165-A of the Penal Code, and, under sub-section (2) of section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act (II of 1947). Sub-section (1) of section 6 empowers the State Government to appoint as many Special Judges as may be necessary. Sub-section (2) provides that no person shall be appointed as a Special Judge unless he is, or has been, a Sessions Judge or an Additional Sessions Judge or an Assistant Sessions Judge. Section 7 specifies what classes of cases these Special Judges may try. Then follows section 8 to which we shall presently return. Section 9 provides among other things that an appeal shall lie to the High Court from the decision of Special Judge as if he were a Court of Session trying cases without a jury. Section 10 provides that all cases triable by Special Judges under section 7 which, immediately before the commencement of the Act, were pending before any Magistrate shall be forwarded for trial to the Special Judge having jurisdiction over such cases.

Section 8 contains four sub-s

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