Revisional jurisdiction of High Court u/A 227.

This is an application in which the jurisdiction vested in this Court by Article 227 of the Constitution has been invoked to set aside or correct an order passed by the Master of this Court on the Original Side in proceedings on appeal preferred against the decree and judgment in C.S. No. 55 of 1954 on the Original Side of this Court.

The question to be considered by the learned Master was, what was the correct Court-fee payable on the memorandum of appeal. Against this decision on that issue, under the provisions of the Court-Fees Act, there can be no appeal, because the statute has provided for none.

The jurisdiction vested in this Court by Article 227 is a very limited one. An erroneous decision with nothing more of any statutory authority will not be enough in exercise of the powers vested in this Court by Article 227, to set aside the order in which the erroneous decision is embodied. Practically, the principles which would apply in deciding whether a writ of certiorari could issue under Article 226 of the Constitution will also apply in deciding whether under Article 227 of the Constitution, an order the correctness of which is impugned, can be set aside. The Supreme Court has pointed out that there is a clear distinction between what constitutes an error of law apparent on the face of the record and a mere erroneous decision, though into which category a given order falls will have to be decided with reference to facts and circumstances of that particular case.

After hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner I am unable to hold that at the worst anything more than an erroneous decision could be pointed out. I am not going into the question whether the decision of the learned Master was right or wrong. All I am saying is there is no error of law apparent on the face of the record to justify any interference in exercise of the power vested in this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution.

Paragraph 2 of the decree in C.S. No. 55 of 1954 ran:

“That defendants 1 and 2 herein are entitled to a half share as heirs of Yellamanda, and the plaintiffs herein are entitled to the other half share in the properties set out in the Schedule to the plaint.”

It should be noticed that the plaintiffs in that suit challenged the validity of the adoption of the second defendant. On that issue they failed. The plaintiffs, challenging the validity of the adoption of the second defendant, claimed recovery of possession of the entire extent of the properties which was in the possession of defendants 1 and 2. The Court ultimately found that plaintiffs were entitled to one half, which meant that defendants were entitled to only one half and that they were not entitled to remain in possession of the entire extent of the properties. It was with reference to these circumstances and the directions and proceedings in the connected suit that the learned Master came to the conclusion that the decree against which the defendants appealed was substantially a decree for possession. I have only set out these features to understand the scope of his decision, not its correctness or otherwise.

Learned counsel for the petitioner urged ex facie the record there was nothing to show that it was a decree for possession and therefore ex facie the order of the Master there was an error of law when he viewed the decree as one for possession. It was a question of construction. The construction placed by the Master may be right or wrong, upon which I am saying nothing. Only it is not a case of an error apparent on the face of the record. On the face of the order of the learned Master, it is at the worst an erroneous decision, which is not enough to justify interference under Article 227 of the Constitution.

The petition is dismissed with costs.

R.M. ----- Petition dismissed.