Rajamannar, C.J.- These two appeals are against the Judgment of Rajagopalan, J., disposing of two petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, and raise the same point, namely, whether the grant to the appellant’s predecessor was of a whole village. There was also another question whether the grant was of both the melwaram and kudiwaram. That question, however, is covered by a finding of fact that the grant consisted only of the melwaram. All the three members of the Estates Abolition Tribunal held that the grant was of a whole village. The Appellant sought in the above two petitions to have the Order of the Tribunal quashed and also to have the notification issued by the Government under the Rent Reduction Act in respect of the same village also quashed. Rajagopalan, J., held that it could not be said that there was no evidence before the Tribunal on which it could come to the conclusion that it came to, namely, that the grant was of a whole village, and that therefore there was no ground on which the order could be quashed.

Mr. V. Vedantachari, learned counsel for the appellant, contended that the order of the Tribunal was vitiated by an error apparent on its face, namely, that the Tribunal cast the onus on the land-holder, that is, the appellant, to prove that the grant was not of a whole village. He relied strongly on the recent decision of the Supreme Court in District Board, Tanjore v. Noor Mohamed1.

The facts necessary to appreciate the contention of the appellant are briefly as follow. The original grant of the village in question is not available. The only evidence available is the extract from the Inam Fair Register relating to this village. That clearly shows that at the time of the inam settlement, there was an extent of 10 acres 52 cents in the village which constituted a separate Devadayam service grant. It is common ground that there is no evidence whatever to show when this grant was made and by whom. The question is whether at the time when the rest of the village was granted to the appellant’s predecessor, the Devadayam grant had already been made. If that be so, then undoubtedly, under Explanation 1 to section 3(2)(d) of the Estates Land Act, the village should be deemed to be an estate notwithstanding that it did not include the lands which had already been granted. It is equally clear that if there is evidence that the original grant was of the whole village; and that at a subsequent date the Devadayam minor inam was carved out of the whole village by the original grantee, then the village would be an “ estate” within the meaning of the Estates Abolition Act and the Rent Reduction Act. But, as pointed out by the Supreme Court, there is also the other contingency of the original grantor reserving to himself this extent when he made the grant of the rest of the village to the appellant’s predecessor, and then, simultaneously or at a subsequent date, granting the Devadayam inam. It may be said that this is not very probable. But the fact is that we have no evidence in the matter. In such a state of paucity of evidence, the case must be decided on the basis of the onus of proof. The Supreme Court has in the cleares terms laid down that the onus would be on the party putting forward the case that the village is an estate ; that is to say, in this case, the onus would be on the Government and the tenants. Undoubtedly, neither the Government nor the tenants have adduced evidence to help them discharge the burden of proof which lay on them. The effect of the Supreme Court’s decision is, if we may say so with great respect, lucidly explained by Satyanarayana Rao, J., in Rama Rao v. Linga Reddi1. This ruling has been followed in subsequent decisions of the Andhra High Court.. Rajagopalan, J, does refer to the above decision of the Supreme Court, but has not discussed the effect of the ruling. The learned Judge says that the question whether in a given case there was evidence to show that Devadayam or serv

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