1957 Supreme(Mad) 161
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Mr. P. V. Rajamannar, Chief Justice, and Mr. Justice PanchapakesaAyyar
Ramalingam Pillai
Versus
Ramalakshmi Ammal
Appeal No. 509 of 1953.
Decided On : 15 July 1957
M. Natesan, for Appellants.
G. R. Jagadisan, for Respondents.
The only substantial question in this appeal against the decree and judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge of Madurai in O.S. No. 9 of 1951 is whether a Hindu widow who becomes entitled to her husband’s share in joint family property under the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act can challenge an alienation made by the other member of the family who was a coparcener with her husband. The facts necessary for the disposal of this appeal may be briefly stated. The plaintiff first respondent is the widow of one Subramania Pillai who died in August, 1942. He was survived by, besides his widow, the plaintiff, his undivided son, the first defendant, and two unmarried daughters, defendants 2 and 3. On 13th August, 1950, the first defendant alienated item 1 of Schedule A of the plaint, a family house, to the fourth defendant for an alleged consideration of Rs. 10,000. In 1951 the widow filed a suit for partition and separate possession of her half share in the property set out in Schedules A and B to the plaint including this item which had been sold to the fourth defendant. She alleged that the said alienation was not binding on her and, therefore, she was entitled to her half share in that item as well. The first and fourth defendants contended that the alienation in favour of the fourth defendant was valid and supported by necessity and therefore binding on the plaintiff. But their case was rejected by the learned trial Judge. There was an alternative plea by the contesting defendants that the widow, the plaintiff, was not in any event entitled to challenge the alienation because she was not a coparcener and her only right under the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act was to take whatever properties remained in the family and she was not entitled to question an alienation made by the sole surviving coparcener, that is, the first defendant in this case. This contention was overruled by the learned trial Judge. He also held that the fourth defendant was not entitled to any equities because of his conduct. In the result he passed a decree in favour of the plaintiff for partition and separate possession of a half share in plaint schedule properties including item I of Schedule A. He also passed a decree for maintenance fixing it on the income of the agricultural land set out in Schedule C. We are not concerned with this part of the decree in appeal. This appeal by defendants 1 and 4 mainly concerns item 1 of Schedule A of the plaint which had been alienated by the first defendant in favour of the fourth defendant.
Appellant’s learned counsel contended before us that the plaintiff-respondent as a widow entitled to rights under the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act could not question the validity or binding nature of the alienation made by the first defendant who was the sole surviving coparcener on the death of her husband in 1942. He was unable, however, to draw our attention to any decision of this Court or of any other Court which would support his contention. He relied on certain observations in Rathnasabapathi v. Saraswathi1, decided by Mack and Krishnaswami Nayudu, JJ. The facts in that case were briefly as follows. One K died on 27th February, 1947, possessed of considerable immovable properties consisting of agricultural lands and houses and also moveables. The suit was filed by the widow for partition and separate possession of a third share in the properties of her husband. She attacked a deed of gift of a part of the joint family property on the ground that it was beyond the powers of the manager of a Hindu family. She also alleged that the deed of gift was a nominal transaction brought into existence for ulterior purposes and it was never acted upon and the properties covered by the deed continued to be treated as joint family properties. The learned Judges of this Court accepted the finding of the learned trial Judge that the gift was a nominal transaction. The widow was therefore entitled to her share in the p