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1956 Supreme(Mad) 309

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Rajagopala Ayyangar
Pakkirisami Naidu alias Varadarajulu Naidu
Versus
The State of Madras through the Chief Secretary to Government, Madras
W.P. No. 413 of 1956.
Decided On : 10 September 1956

Advocates:
The Court made the following

Order of requisition not setting out consideration of request.

Headnote:Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1949-Section 3(1)(a) and (b) and (3) -Order of requisition-Offends Article 19(1)(b) of the Constitution.

       

Order

The question raised by this writ petition is as regards the proper construction of certain provisions of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (XXV of 1949) and the validity of certain action taken by the Accommodation Controller in regard to the premises of the petitioner. The petitioner is the owner of two house Nos. 60 and 61, Gangathareeswarar Koil Street, Purasawalkam, Madras. House No. 60 has been occupied by an official of the Central Government and its only relevancy for the present proceedings is that it is not available for occupation by the petitioner. House No. 61 had been let out to tenants for the past several years. The last tenant, who occupied that property, died in 1955, and his heirs, who continued to remain in the premises for some time after the death of the tenant, vacated the premises on 14th April, 1955. On 20th April, 1955, the petitioner intimated the Accommodation Controller of the vacancy, but in this notice, which is purported to be one under section 3(1)(a) of the Act the petitioner did not furnish the particulars which he was required to furnish under section 3(1)(b) of the Act, a matter to which I shall refer in a little more detail later. The Accommodation Controller when he received this notice stated that it was not in proper form and directed the petitioner to submit a notice, which would conform to the rules. The petitioner did so and sent another notice on 27th April, 1955, which admittedly conformed to the requirements of the rules. In this he gave all the particulars, which a landlord, when giving notice under section 3 (1), had to furnish. In this communication, dated 20th April, 1955, the petitioner had stated that house No. 61 was required for his own occupation and that the Accommodation Controller might be pleased not to requisition the building. But notwithstanding the request contained in this communication, the Accommodation Controller who is the respondent here by his order, dated 3rd May, 1955, requisitioned the house bearing door No. 61 for the accommodation of an Officer of the Income-tax Department. The petitioner applied to the Secretary, Home Department for redress ; but not having obtained it, he has approached this Court with this writ petition.

Learned counsel for the petitioner raised three contentions: The first was that his client’s notice, dated 20th April, 1955, was substantially in compliance with the enactment and that as the Accommodation Controller had received this notice on 21st April, 1955, the ten days’ time within which a requisition could take place under section 3(3) of the Act expired by the end of the month and that the order, dated 3rd May, 1955, was out of time. As part of this argument he urged that the notice or the intimation, dated 27th April, 1955, in which the petitioner furnished the full particulars, which were demanded of him was despatched beyond the seven days’ time mentioned in section 3(1) and was not therefore a notice on which a requisition under section 3(3) could be founded. The second contention was that the Accommodation Controller had not considered the bona fide requirement of the petitioner of the premises No. 61 before directing the requisition and that, as this material matter has not been considered by the Accommodation Controller or by the Government, the order should be set aside. Lastly, he contended that as the petitioner still continued to remain in possession of the property, any attempt on the part of the Government to enforce the requisition would offend the guarantee contained in Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution.

I shall consider these contentions in the order in which I have set them above. Section 3(1)(a) enacts:

“Every landlord shall, within seven days after the building becomes vacant by his ceasing to occupy it, or by the termination of a tenancy, or by release from requisition give notice of the vacancy in writing to the officer authorized in that behalf by the State Government (hereinafter in






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