This is a Civil Revision Petition filed against the order made by the learned Subordinate Judge of Kozhikode in O.S. No. 76 of 1952.

The facts are: The plaintiff Kuttikrishna Menon was employed in the Guru-vaym Devaswom of which the present hereditary trustees are defendants 2 and 3. The plaintiff’s services were terminated with effect from 10th July, 1952. The plaintiff then rushed to Court with this suit in order to nullify this order and also for recovery of damages contending that the order terminating his services was illegal, void and inoperative and that he was not given an opportunity to explain the charges against him, if any, before removal from service. The contention of the defendants was that this suit was impliedly barred by reason of section 49 and 93 of the Madras Act XIX of 1951 read with section 9, Civil Procedure Code. The learned Subordinate Judge relying upon Kallalagar Devasthanam v. Thirumala Nambigal1 and Secretary of State v. Mask & Co.2, held that where principles of natural justice or judicial procedure have not been complied with, civil Courts have jurisdiction to examine into cases, and gave a finding under issue 1 that the suit was maintainable and that he had jurisdiction to proceed with the trial of the suit. Hence this Civil Revision Petition by the defeated trustees of the Devaswom.

Generally, civil Courts have jurisdiction to entertain all suits of a civil nature except suits of which the cognisance is expressly or impliedly barred (section 9, Civil Procedure Code). The question of jurisdiction of the civil Courts has to be examined with reference to two aspects, viz., the rules of implied bar and the rule of express bar. The rule of implied bar may apply by reason of the Constitution of separate tribunals under the Act.

The rule has been succinctly stated in the A.I.R. commentaries on the Civil Procedure Code (5th (1951) edition, page 142). Where a special tribunal or a public body is created by or under the authority of an Act of Legislature for determining questions which are the creation of the Act, like those arising from the administration and management of temples under the Hindu Religious’ Endowment Act the jurisdiction of that tribunal or body is exclusive and civil Courts cannot take cognizance of such matters. Where in the exercise of such jurisdiction an individual may receive an injury and a party actually receives such injury still the jurisdiction of the civil Courts is ousted and the method of redress is that which is pointed out by the statute creating the jurisdiction; Krishnamurthi v. Parthasarathi3 , (Lease and Rent Control Act); Mohesh Chandra v. Abdul Gafur4 , (Debt Settlement Board); Brij Behari Lal v. Emperor5 , Aktieselskab v. Secretary of State6 , (Sea Customs Act); Subbayya v. Thippa Reddi7 , (Co-operative Societies Act); Panchapakasa Aiyar v. Secretary of State8 , (Madras Electoral Rules); Ramanatha v. Arunachalam9, (Hindu Religious’ Endowment Act); Dayaram Ramdas v. Secretary of State10 , (Income-tax); Jogendranath v. Tollyganj, Municipality11(Municipal Act); Chandra Sarkar v. Bejoy Chand12 , (Land Acquisition Act); Ramachandra v. Secretary of State13 , (Forest Act), Heddon v. Evans14(Military Law). So long as that prescribed tribunal acts within its jurisdiction the jurisdiction of the civil Court is barred in the absence of mala fides or fraud. Where, however, the tribunal acts ultra vires or refuses to exercise its jurisdiction or acts mala fide or arbitrarily, the civil Court has power to interfere and set matters aright. (For an exhaustive discussion see the Full Bench decision of Sultan Ali v. Nur Hussain.15 Therefore, before the civil Courts can interfere, the party aggrieved must have recourse to the special procedure prescribed under the Act and exhaust his. remedies. In other words, where a mode of redressing an injury caused by the exercise of statutory powers is indicated by the statute itself, that is the only mode of redress available to the inj