Proceedings if can be treated as proceeding before commencement of the Act.

This reference raises a question of the construction of section 87(2) of the Madras Court Fees Act XIV of 1955.

The matter directly arose out of a copy application filed for obtaining a copy of judgment and decree in Civil Revision Petition No. 910 of 1954 where a two annas court-fee stamp was affixed on the application, which was the fee payable under the Court Fees Act of 1870, the present court-fee being four annas for the same application under Article 11(a) and (b) of Schedule II to the Act. The contention of the learned Advocate is that the application for a copy is in respect of a proceeding arising from a suit or proceeding before the commencement of the Act, and as such under section 87(2), such an application would be governed by the previous Court Fees Act VII of 1870.

Section 87 of Act XIV of 1955 is in the following terms:

“(1) The Court Fees Act, 1870 (Central Act VII of 1870) in its application to the State of Madras and in relation to the fees and stamps other than fees and stamps relating to documents presented or to be presented before an Officer serving under the Central Government and the Suits Valuation Act, 1887 (Central Act VII of 1887), in its application to the State of Madras are hereby repealed.

(2) All suits and proceedings instituted before the commencement of this Act and all proceedings by way of appeal, revision or otherwise arising therefrom whether instituted before or after such commencement shall, notwithstanding the repeal of the Court Fees Act, 1870 (Central Act VII of 1870) and the Suits Valuation Act, 1887 (Central Act VII of 1887), be governed by the provisions of the said Acts and the Rules made thereunder.”

The contention of the Assistant Government Pleader is that a copy application for judgment and decree, even though it relates to a suit or proceeding instituted before the commencement of the Act or in respect of a revision petition instituted before its commencement, will be governed only by the provisions of the new Act, as a copy application could not come within the meaning of a

“proceeding by way of appeal, revision or otherwise arising therefrom and instituted after such commencement.”

The learned Assistant Government Pleader argued at length on the meaning to be given to the word ‘proceeding’ by reference to the decisions where the meaning of that word has been considered, and contended that an application for a copy could not be a ‘proceeding’ and that therefore section 87(2) would have no application. The provisions of the earlier Act would apply only to suits and proceedings insituted before the commencement of the Act and all proceedings by way of appeal, revision or otherwise arising therefrom whether instituted before or after such commencement. The copy application is in respect of a Civil Revision Petition instituted before the commencement; but it is urged that the question that has to be considered would be as to whether a copy application is a proceeding arising from a suit or proceeding instituted before the commmencement of the Act and for that purpose the meaning of the word ‘proceeding’ requires to be looked into. It is argued that the ‘proceeding’ must be in the nature of a suit in the sense that anything which initiates and not a step in the proceeding and that unless a copy application could be said to initiate an action, it cannot come within the term ‘proceeding arising out of a suit or a proceeding instituted before the commencement of the Act.‘Different meanings are given to the word ‘proceeding’ occurring in different enactments.

The meaning of the words ‘proceedings instituted’ in section 2 of the Married Women’s Property Act, 1893, was considered by the House of Lords in Hood Barrs v. Hariot1. The question there was whether an appeal by a woman from a judgment in an action in which she is defendant is not a ‘proceeding instituted’ within the meaning of the Married Women’s Property Act and an order cannot be made under that section for the payment of the