Conditions of stage carriage permit within the rule-making powers.

The only question that arises for determination in this application under Article 226 of the Constitution for the issue of a writ of Certiorari is, whether Rule 160-B of the Rules framed under the Motor Vehicles Act is intra vires.

The petitioner held a stage carriage permit issued by the Regional Transport Authority, Malabar, for plying his bus from Olavakote to Palghat. He transported postal mails for a time by contract direct with the postal authorities. On 2nd December, 1953, he informed the Regional Transport Authority, Malabar, ,that he would not be able to carry the mails any further. The Regional Transport Authority enforced the condition of the permit prescribed by Rule 160-B and directed the Petitioner, by its order, dated 12th April, 1954, to carry mails in return for a monthly subsidy of Rs. 150. The petitioner moved the Government without success under section 64-A of the Act 10 set aside that order. It is the validity of that order which has been challenged in the application for the issue of a writ of Certiorari.

Rule 160-B runs:

“It shall be a condition of every stage carriage permit that the holder of the permit shall, if so required by the transport authority which granted the permit, carry mails at such rates and on such terms as the transport authority may fix after consultation with the holder of the permit and the postal authorities concerned.”

The petitioner knew when he applied for a permit and when he obtained it that the condition imposed by Rule 160-B was one of the conditions of the permit. Having had the advantage of that permit all this time and still retaining the advantage, it is not open to him to challenge the validity of that condition of the permit at this stage in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. The learned counsel for the Petitioner urged that Rule 160-B was really a dead Rule, and that the Petitioner could have an opportunity to complain against the validity of the Rule only when the Regional Transport Authority sought to enforce that Rule. I am unable to see any difference in principle on the basis put forward by the learned counsel for the Petitioner, when what the Petitioner seeks under Article 226 of the Constitution is a discretionary relief. I am not, however, resting my decision in this case on this aspect of it.

Section 48 (d) is as follows:-

“A Regional Transport Authority may, after consideration of the matters set forth in sub-section (1) of section 47.............”

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(d) attach to a stage carriage permit any prescribed condition or any one of the following conditions.......“

(Six items were enumerated under section 47(d) but it may not be necessary to refer to these in detail).

The Regional Transport Authority could thus include amongst the conditions of the permit any”prescribed’ conditions. “Prescribed” has been defined by section 2(21) of the Act to mean prescribed by Rules made under the Act. Section 68 of the Act conferred authority on the State Government to make Rules under the Act. Section 68 runs:

“(1) A State Government may make Rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of this chapter (that is Chapter IV).

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, Rules under this section may be made with respect to all or any of the following matters, namely. ...”

Then follows a list of items numbered (a) to (Z-a).

Rule 160-B is a rule made under the provisions of section 68 of the Act. Therefore the condition imposed by Rule 160-B is a “prescribed condition” within the meaning of section 48(d).

The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that Rule 160-B was ultra vires, and that it fell outside the scope of the power vested in the State Government by section 68 of the Act. He pointed out that carriage of mails was not one of the enumerated items in section 68(2) of the Act with reference to which the State Government was specifically authorised to make Rules. As the learned Advocate-General rightly pointed out, section 68