SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Audio Icon Pause Audio Icon
judgment-img

1955 Supreme(Mad) 230

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Mr. P.V. Rajamannar, Chief Justice, and Mr. Justice Panchapakesa Ayyar
Puthiya. Purayil Abdurahiman, Karnavan and Manager of the tavazhi tarwad
Versus
Thayath Kancheentavida Avoomma
Referred Case No. 41 of 1954.
Decided On : 07 September 1955

Advocates:
K.V. Venkatasubramania Iyer, for A. Achuthan Nambiar, for the Petitioners.
The Advocate-General (V.K. Tiruvenkatachari), and the Government Pleader (C.A. Vaidialingam) on behalf of the State.
D.A. Krishna Variar, for the 1st Respondent.

Rajamannar, C.J.-The learned District Munsif of Cannanore has referred the: following question for decision by this Court:

“Whether the Madras Shariat (Amendment) Act (Act XVIII of 1949) is ultra vires of Article 19 Clause(1)(f) of the Constitution Act.”

The question was raised in a suit pending before the learned District Munsif brought by the widow of one deceased Abdulla Kalpha for partition and separate possession of certain properties, described in schedule A to the plaint. Abdulla Kalpha was a member of a Marumakkathayam tarwad. On 30th October, 1918, the members of the tarwad executed a karar in and by which the main tarwad was divided into three tavazhis. Abdulla Kalpha was a member of the third tavazhi and was one of the executants of the document. The said karar provided inter alia that in case one tavazhi became extinct, the properties allotted to the said tavazhi would lapse to the other tavazhis. Abdulla Kalpha was the sole surviving member of the third tavazhi. He died on 10th January, 1952. The main question in the case is whether on his death, the properties of the third tavazhi, which Abdulla Kalpha died possessed of, lapsed to the second tavazhi, the first tavazhi having become extinct, as per the terms of the karar, or whether the widow and other heirs of Abdulla Kalpha, according to the Muslim Shariat, i.e., personal law, became entitled to the said properties. The plaintiff claimed that she and the other personal heirs, defendants 1 to 8, became entitled to the properties, because of the provisions of the Madras Shariat (Amendment) Act of 1949.

Defendants 9 and 10, who are the karnavan and the senior most anandiravan of the second tavazhi, contended that the said Act was void because it was repugnant to the provisions of Article 19, Clause (1)(f) of the Constitution.

Madras Act XVIII of 1949, the impugned Act, amended the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act (XXVI of 1937) passed by the Central Legislature. The only material section of the Act for the purpose of this reference is section 2. "That section originally stood as follows:

"Notwithstanding any custom or usage to the contrary, in all questions (save questions relating to agricultural land) regarding intestate succession special property of females, including personal property inherited or obtained under contract or gift or any other provision of personal law, marriage, dissolution of marriage, including talak, ila, ziar, lian, khula and mubarat, maintenance, dower, guardianship, gifts, trusts and trust properties, and wakfs (other than charities and charitable institutions and charitable and religious endowments), the rule of decision in cases where the parties are Muslims shall be the Muslim personal Law (Shariat)."

This section was amended by the Madras Act XVIII of 1949 and the amended section runs thus:-

"Notwithstanding any custom or usage to the contrary, in all questions regarding intestate succession, special property of females, including personal property inherited or obtained under contract or gift or any other provision of personal law, marriage, dissolution of marriage, including talak, ila, zihar, lan, khula and muharat, maintenance, dower, guardianship, gifts, trusts and trust properties and wakfs, the rule of decision in cases where the parties are Muslims shall be the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat)."

‘The obvious object of the Madras Amendment was to extend the scope of the Central Act to agricultural lands as well within the State of Madras.

Mr. K.V. Venkatasubrahmania Iyer, who appeared on behalf of defendants 9 and 10, frankly conceded that he could not usefully urge the plea that Madras Act XVIII of 1949 was unconstitutional on the ground that it contravened Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution, if the relevant provision, viz., section 2 is construed in the only way it should be, viz., that it is only in respect of the enumerated matters that custom or usage has been abrogated, and the result of the Act is not to totally repeal












































Click Here to Read the rest of this document

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
SupremeToday Portrait Ad
supreme today icon
logo-black

An indispensable Tool for Legal Professionals, Endorsed by Various High Court and Judicial Officers

Please visit our Training & Support
Center or Contact Us for assistance

qr

Scan Me!

India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!

For Daily Legal Updates, Join us on :

whatsapp-icon Back to top