Judgment.-C.R.P. No. 1079 of 1952 arises out of an order passed by the learned District Munsif of Vridhachalam, refusing leave to the petitioner to file a suit in forma pauperis on the ground that he has means to pay court-fee due on the plaint. In the order refusing leave to sue as a paper the learned District Munsif directed the petitioner to pay court-fee on or before 31st January, 1952. This direction was not complied with by the petitioner and when the matter came up again and after giving further extension of time, the learned District Munsif dismissed the original petition for leave to sue in forma pauperis. No appeal or revision has been preferred against the subsequent order dismissing the original petition for leave to sue as a pauper.

A preliminary objection has been taken by the learned counsel for the respondent that the C.R.P. No. 1079 of J952 is not competent by reason of the subsequent order rejecting the plaint in toto for non-compliance with the direction to pay court-fee due on the plaint and which has not been taken on revision or appeal. He has invited my attention in support of his contention to a decision of my learned brother Panchapakesa Aiyar, J., reported in Bommisetti Ramayamma, In re1. The facts reported in that case are exactly on a par with the facts obtaining in the present case and there appears to be no controversy at all with regard to those facts. Panchapakesa Aiyar, J., has followed a Full Bench ruling of this Court reported in Satyanarayanacharyulu v. Ramalingam2, and has applied the principle of that decision to the facts of that case- I have gone through the decision of the Full Bench and. also the decision of my learned brother. In my view, the facts that arose for consideration in the Full Bench ruling are not in pari materia with the facts that arise in the present Civil Revision Petition and I do not think that the principle of that Full Bench decision could be made applicable to the facts of the present case. In the Full Bench decision the suit had already been numbered and registered and on objection being taken as to the correctness of the Court-fee paid it was found that the suit had been undervalued and a large amount of deficit Court-fee was ordered to be paid and it was not paid. Thereupon the suit was dismissed. The order passed in that case is one which comes directly under the definition of a decree contained in section 2, sub-clause (2) Civil Procedure Code. But in the present case, it cannot be said that what has been rejected is a plaint or a suit; for taking into consideration the special procedure provided for in the Civil Procedure Code under Order 33, for applications for leave to sue in forma pauperis, it cannot be said that until and unless the application for leave to sue has been granted there is any plaint before the Court to be numbered, registered or rejected. This would arise only when an order is passed under Order 33, rule 8, which is not the case here. What is before the Court until such a stage is reached is only an application for leave to sue. If a condition is imposed that in order to grant the application for leave to sue or to entertain the plaint filed along with the application as a suit, Court-fee is to be paid within a certain date, it cannot be said that the original petition has become converted into a plaint or a suit in order to attract the provisions of Order 7, rule 11. It is also stretching too much to say that simply because a small, fee of Re. 0-8-0 has been affixed to the application for leave to sue in forma pauperis the Court-fee that has been directed to be paid is an additional Court-fee on the plaint as if the plaint had already been numbered and entertained as a suit. Except the Full Bench decision which has been applied to the facts of the case before my learned brother, Panchapakesa Aiyar, J., there appears to be no other authority cited before him on the point which has arisen for decision before me. Mr. Venkatesan, the learned

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