Rajamannar, C.J.-The petitioner filed an application before the Additional Rent Controller, Mathurai, for eviction of the Respondent, who was her tenant of premises No.132, West Masi street, Mathurai. The following order was passed on that application, on 22nd February,1951:

“The parties agree and endorse in the application that the respondent may be given six months time to vacate and give possession of the building. So the respondent is granted six months time from this date to vacate the building described in the application and put the petitioner in possession of the same.”

Against this order, the tenant-respondent filed an appeal to the Appellate Authority, who was the Principal Subordinate Judge of Mathurai. The appeal was dismissed on a preliminary objection as regards its maintainability on the ground that the order appealed against was passed with the consent of the parties. The tenant thereupon filed a revision petition to the District Court under section 12-B of the Act, which had been added to the original Act by the Amendment Act of 1951. The learned District Judge allowed the petition, set aside the order of the Appellate Authority dismissing the appeal and remanded the matter to the Appellate Authority for fresh consideration of a new question raised on behalf of the tenant based on the provision of the Amending Act (VIII of 1951), by which a new sub-section was added in section 7, namely, 7 (3-A). The learned Judge held that an appeal lay against the order of the Rent Controller. This conclusion was based on the fact that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure did not apply to proceedings under the Rent Control Act. This Revision Petition has been filed to set aside the order of the District Judge.

This Revision Petition can be disposed of on the short ground that no appeal lay against an order of the Rent Controller passed on consent of parties. We agree with the learned District Judge that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure do not as such apply to proceedings under the Rent Control Act. The provision under the Rent Control Act conferring a right of appeal against an order passed by the Rent Controller is contained in section 12(1)(b) of that Act, which runs as follows:

“Any person aggrieved by an order passed by the Controller may, within fifteen days from the date of such order, prefer an appeal in writing to the appellate authority having jurisdiction.”

A party who has consented to an order cannot in law be deemed to be a “person aggrieved” by such an order. It is evidently because of this well established position that the respondent alleged fraud and other circumstances vitiating the order purporting to have been passed by consent. It may be that if the respondent had established fraud or undue influence or such other vitiating circumstance, the consent order might have been set aside either by the Rent Controller himself or by the Appellate Authority. But there was no attempt to prove any such circumstance. The appeal was, therefore, not maintainable. The learned Subordinate Judge, held that an appeal was not maintainable. The learned District Judge completely overlooked this aspect of the matter and has held otherwise.

On 1st May, 1951, the Amedment Act of 1951 came into force. It inter alia introduced a new provision in section 7, namely, 7 (3-A), of which the material clause is clause (i). It is as follows:-

“No order for eviction shall be passed under sub-section (3)-

(i) against any tenant who is engaged in any employment or class of employment notified by the State Government as an essential service for the purposes of this sub-section, unless the landlord is himself engaged in any employment or class of employment which has been so notified ;”

Though this new provision was introduced subsequent to the filing of the application for eviction in this case, the contention on behalf of the tenant was that the new provision would apply to proceedings pending when the Amending Act came into forc

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