IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Mr. Justice Govinda Menon and Mr. Justice Ramaswami, JJ.
Kana Navanna Navanna Narayanappa Naidu
Versus
The Revenue Divisional Officer, Sivakasi
Appeal No. 388 of 1950.
Decided On : 11 August 1954
The learned Subordinate Judge held that the market value of the land acquired on the relevant date was Rs. 100 per cent of land. But he held that, as the application under section 18 of the Act was filed by the appellant beyond the period of six weeks prescribed by the proviso to section 18, the reference itself was incompetent.
The correctness of the finding that the market value was not Rs. 25 as fixed by the Collector but Rs. 100 per cent as found by the learned Subordinate Judge, was not challenged before me. The only question to be decided in this appeal is, whether the learned Subordinate Judge has jurisdiction to investigate or decide whether the application of the appellant under section 18 of the Act was barred by limitation. That the application itself was beyond the six weeks prescribed by the proviso to section 18 did not admit of any dispute.
There is cleavage of judicial opinion on the question, whether a Court, to which a reference has been made under section 19 of the Act, can go behind the reference and decide whether a reference, on an application barred under the proviso to section 18 of the Act, is competent.
In In re Land Acquisition Act1, Chandavarkar, J., held that the Court was not only entitled to but was bound to satisfy itself that the conditions laid down in section 18 of the Act had been complied with. That view was accepted as correct by a Divisional Bench of the Bombay High Court in Mahadeo Krishna v. Mamlatdar of Alibhag2. In Gulam Muhyuddin v. The Secretary of State for India3a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court accepted as correct the view of Chandavarkar, J., in In re Land Acquisition Act1. In the course of their judgment the learned Judges of the Lahore High Court referred also to an earlier unreported decision of their Court, where also the same view was taken.
The principles laid down in In re Land Acquisition Act1, were accepted as correct by the Allahabad High Court in Sukhbir Singh v. Secretary of State for India in Council4. But in its subsequent decision Secretary of State for India in Council v. Bhagwan Prasad5, the learned Judges of that Court observed that the facts in Sukhbir Singh v. Secretary of State for India in Council4, in which the claimants had not made any application at all under section 18 of the Act, were distinguishable, and laid down that the Court had no jurisdiction to go behind the reference to decide whether the application to the Collector under section 18 was barred by limitation. That was followed by the Allahabad High Court in its subsequent decision reported in Secretary of of State v. Bhagwan5 .
Though it was not the question of limitation as such that arose for determination in Mahananda Pal v. Secretary of State for India in Council6, the learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court, observed that they were not inclined to attach much weight to the views of Chandavarkar, J., in In re Land Acquisition Act1.
In Sri Venkateswaraswami Varu v. Sub-Collector, Bezwada7, Kuppuswami Ayyar, J., apparently preferred the later Allahabad view, and he held that the Court had no jurisdiction to go into the question, whether the application under section 18 that preceded the reference under section 19 was barred by limitation. In
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