Govinda Menon, J.-I am in agreement with my learned brother that the appeals and revision should be dismissed, but I wish to add a few words with regard to the scope and import of Article 178 of the Limitation Act. Before its amendment by the Arbitration Act, X of 1940, the first column of that Article was as follows:

"Under the same Code for the filing in Court of an award in a suit made in any manner referred to arbitration by order of Court or of an award made in any manner referred to arbitration without the intervention of Court. "

The period of limitation fixed was six months and the time from which the period began to run as mentioned in the third column was the date of the award. The form in which the Article now stands was the result of the amendment by which the period is cut down to ninety days and the terminus a quo is stated to be the date of service of the notice of the making of the award ; in column 1 the description of the application reads as:

"Under the Arbitration Act, 1940, for the filing in Court of an award".

The change with regard to the time from which the period begins to run is significant because originally when once the award is made, if a decree has to be passed in terms of the award, then the application has to be filed within six months thereof. The date of the award is considered to be of prime importance in the matter of filing the application. It seems to me what when the third column specifies the starting point of limitation as the date of service of the notice of the making of the award, this Article can be applied only to cases where the party applies to the Court for a decree in terms of the award. Otherwise, it is impossible to find any necessity for the change. It was clear that under the article as it stood originally, the period of limitation was prescribed for an application by the party. Difficulties had arisen on account of the starting point being the date of the award because there had been instances in which the award was signed on a particular date but pronounced later, in which case hardship was caused because the limitation began to run even from an anterior date to the time when the parties got notice of the award. If therefore the unamended article was restricted to cases where the party had to move the Court, there is no reason for imputing to the Legislature another intention especially when the language of the third column was altered to mitigate the hardship caused on the parties.

In this connection it would be profitable to refer to Article 158 which gives the period of limitation for setting aside an award. The first column is to the following effect:-

"Under the Arbitration Act, 1940, to set aside an award or to get an award remitted for reconsideration."

The period prescribed is thirty days from the date of service of the notice of filing of the award. There can be no doubt whatever that Article 158 is intended to provide a limitation for an application by the parties. It is therefore unnecessary to make a distinction between Article 158 and Article 178 as to the persons to whom it should apply. If Article 158 cannot apply to an arbitrator himself because it is not the business of the arbitrator either to have the award set aside or to get it remitted, I do not see any reason why Article 178 should be construed as fixing a time for the arbitrator to file the award in Court. Such being the case, on a plain construction of the two Articles along with their position in the third division of the First Schedule of the Limitation Act, I am of opinion that these two articles provide for applications by parties and not by the arbitrator himself.

But it is urged on behalf of the appellant that Rules 5 and 6 under the Indian Arbitration Act printed at page 244 Chapter XIV of the Civil Rules of Practice Volume 1, contemplate an application by the arbitrator when he moves the Court for filing the award. The second step in the argument is: for filing an award by an arbitrator, if an ap

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