The first defendant is the petitioner. In 1926, the Mannarghat Moopil Nair granted a lease of a very considerable extent of land in his estate in favour of two persons, Jacob Thomas and Tommy Joseph. They, in their turn, assigned their rights to the fourth defendant a company called the Charel Rubber Company, limited. The first defendant, a private limited company called the Pullickel Estates (1947) Ltd., obtained an assignment of the leasehold from the Charel Rubber Company, Limited. On 8th September, 1952, the first defendant company entered into an agreement to convey its rights in the properties to the plaintiff for a sum of Rs.58,000. An advance of Rs.13,000 was paid, and it was agreed between the parties that the balance would be paid at the time the sale deed was executed. It was also agreed between the parties that

“the purchase shall be completed on or before the 4th October, 1952, at Madras, where, for the convenience of the vendor, the purchaser agrees to have the sale deed registered”.

Under the Madras Preservation of Private Forests Act, the consent of the Collector of Malabar had to be obtained before the sale could take effect. With a view to obtaining the consent of its officer, the vendor gave to the vendees one letter address to the Collector of Malabar and another addressed to the Tahsildar of Perinthalmanna. By an order dated 29th October, 1952, the Collector refused to give his. permission for the sale. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Ottapalam, claiming Rs.28,000 as damages from defendants 1 to 3. There was also a prayer for the creation of a charge in favour of the plaintiff over the leasehold properties. Defendants 1 to 3 filed written statements taking inter alia the point that the Court at Ottapalam had no jurisdiction in the matter. The learned Sub-Judge framed a preliminiary issue on that point and held that he had jurisdiction to proceed with the suit. The present petition has been filed to revise this order of the learned Subordinate Judge.

It will be noticed that though the property is situate in Malabar, the agreement to sell was entered into in Madras. The parties also explicitly covenanted that the sale deed was to be executed in Madras. Since the agreement to sell provides that payment was to be made at the time of the execution of the sale deed, it follows that the balance of the purchase money was also to the paid in Madras. It is clear, therefore, that the breach of contract was in Madras. Normally therefore the action should have been brought in Madras. But the learned Subordinate Judge thought that the circumstances that the plaintiff claimed a charge over the leasehold properties, which lay in his jurisdiction, brought the action within the scope of section 16 of the Civil Procedure Code and conferred jurisdiction on him in respect of the matter. This is how he stated his view:

“Here the plaintiff has claimed, a charge for the plaint claim over the immoveable properties mentioned in the plaint schedule. Admittedly, they are situate within the jurisdiction of this Court Therefore, this is the only Court which can entertain the suit. Suppose it is filed in Madras. The plaintiff cannot expect any relief in respect of immoveable properties mentioned in the plaint. He can get only a personal decree against the defendant.”

It appears to me that this is not the correct view of the matter. As I have already pointed out, the contract was entered into i Madras; its completion was to be in Madras and the breach of it was in Madras. The circumstance that the plaintiff prayed for a charge on the property and that it is situate within the jurisdiction of Ottapalam Court will not give that Court jurisdiction. If a prayer made in the plaint is to be the governing criterion, then it is easy to see that a plaintiff can bypass all the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code for determining the proper forum, and can choose his own Court. Suppose A were to