Scope of the provisions of Section 6(1).

This is an application under Article 226 of the Constitution for the issue of a writ of certiorari to set aside the proceedings taken by the Government under the Land Acquisition Act to acquire the property of the petitioner.

About four grounds of land belonging to the petitioner in S. No. 344/2, since demarcated 344/3, were leased by him to five persons, hereinafter referred to as tenants, who lived in the superstructures constructed by them on that land. The petitioner terminated their leases and sought their eviction which was ordered by the Court of Small Causes on 27th February, 1950. The tenants filed suits to avoid the orders of eviction, but the suits were dismissed by the City Civil Court on 31st January, 1951. The appeals preferred by the tenants to the High Court were dismissed on 27th August, 1953.

Apparently the tenants approached the Director of Harijan Welfare to acquire the site for their benefit and the Director of Harijan Welfare addressed the Government on 6th October, 1953, to acquire the land for the ostensible public purpose of“providing the Harijans of Ekangipuram Colony” with house sites. The tenants had apparently agreed to meet the entire cost of the acquisition. The notification under section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act was ordered by Government on 15th January, 1954 and was published in the official Gazette on 20th January, 1954. The declaration under section 6(1) of the Act was published by the Government on 27th January, 1954. Pending completion of the proceedings for acquisition under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, the Government took possession of the land on 5th February, 1954, after issuing a notice to the petitioner on 2nd February, 1954, to deliver possession of the land. The petitioner challenged the validity of the proceedings taken by the Government under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act on the following grounds:

(1) The proposed acquisition was not for public purposes;

(2) Legally it was a fraud on the statutory powers vested in the Government by the Act to acquire the petitioner’s property for the benefit of the tenants whose rights had been negatived by the Civil Courts;

(3) The requirements of the proviso to section 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act were not satisfied.

The petitioner also urged that there was no necessity in this case for the Government to resort to the provisions of section 17 of the Act or to dispense with the notice and enquiry prescribed by section 5(a) of the Act.

I propose to confine myself only to the third of the objections enumerated above. The proviso to section 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act runs:

“Provided that no such declaration shall be made unless the compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid by a Company, or wholly or partly out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority.”

In Suryanarayana v. Province of Madras1, a Full Bench of this Court observed at page 158:

“In interpreting the proviso we can only have regard to the words used and, in our judgment, it is sufficient compliance with the proviso if any part of the compensation is paid out of public funds. One anna is a part of the compensation. It is true it is a small part, but it is nevertheless a part. We consider that the learned Judges who decided Senga Naicken v. Secretary of State2 took the correct view.”

The contention of the petitioner, that in this case there was no evidence that the Government proposed to contribute even that one anna from the public revenues towards the cost of the acquisition of the petitioner’s site, appears to be well founded. That the Government did not traverse in the counter-statement it filed the specific allegation of the petitioner, that the entire cost of the acquisition was to be met by the tenants, may not conclude the issue. The letters written by the Director of Harijan Welfare to the Government and to the tenants, copies of which were placed before me, indicate that the tenants were to