Effect of failure to refer to the renewals of the lease.

This second appeal arises out of a suit in ejectment. The tenant is the appellant. On 12th April, 1933, the appellant and his father the 1st defendant, executed in favour of the plaintiff-respondent, a chalgenichit in respect of the suit holding. The period of the lease was one year, but after the efflux of the period the tenants did not surrender possession but continued to be in occupation. There was a renewal of the lease in 1937 and again in 1942, Exhibits A-14 and A-13. On 6th November, 1945, the landlord issued a registered notice calling upon the tenants to quit and deliver possession. The suit in ejectment was filed on 17th April, 1946. Both the Courts below have decreed the suit.

In the second appeal, Mr. Krishna Rao, learned counsel for the appellant, urged two grounds. He first contended that there was no proper notice to quit. This contention is based entirely on the fact that in the notice to quit Exhibit B-1, there is a reference to the chalgenichit dated 12th April, 1933, but there is no reference to the two renewals in 1937 and 1942. I do not think that the omission to mention the two later leases, in any way renders the notice to quit improper or invalid. The notice in question contains the essential features of such a notice, namely, that it calls upon the tenants to quit and deliver possession and it also prescribes a time within which the possession has to be surrendered. So long as there is no defect in respect of these particulars and the period of notice is reasonable, it cannot be said that the notice is invalid, because the particulars as regards the tenancy are not accurately set out. I agree with the Courts below that Exhibit B-1 is a valid notice to quit.

Mr. Krishna Rao next contended that in any event the appellant is entitled to the value of the improvements effected by the defendants. Unfortunately for the appellant, there are two obstacles in his way. The first is the clause in each of the three leases specifically providing that the tenants had no right to make any kind of improvements and even if they made any improvements, they had no right to any compensation. There is also an admission in each of the three leases that the entire improvements on the property and the material itself all belong to the landlord and not to the tenants. Mr. Krishna Rao tried to get out of the mischief of this clause by arguing that the last of the leases, namely, the lease of 1942, had expired after a period of one year, and thereafter the defendants must be deemed to have been only tenants holding over, and the term embodied in the clause above mentioned will not be one of the implied terms of the tenancy by holding over. I do not agree with this contention. It is well established that if there is no agreement fixing the terms of a new lease, the terms of the old lease must be deemed to be applicable. Where the tenant holds over after the expiration of the term, he holds subject to all the covenants in the lease which are applicable to the new situation. The defendant must therefore be held to be subject to the covenant in respect of improvements contained in the original lease. Learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the ruling in Gnanadasikam Pillai v. Boopalarayar1. That decision does not directly apply to the facts of this case. In that case, there was a collateral security for the payment of rent, and it was held that after the determination of the lease there was a holding over, it is not possible to carry over the collateral security which was not part of the lease transaction so as to enable the plaintiff landlord to claim a charge for the arrears of rent for the whole of the subsequent period. In that decision, reference was made to a decision of the Calcutta High Court in which it was held that a stipulation in the original lease that at the expiration of the term the lessee should give up possession without notice, could not be imported into the new tenancy, created by holding over and