Admissibility of document in evidence registered after expiry of time prescribes.

The only question in these Letters Patent Appeals against the judgment of Panchapagesa Sastry, J., disposing of two second appeals relates. to the validity of the adoption of one Ramamurthi to Lakshminarasayya by his. widow. Both the Courts below found that the adoption had been made in fact and that finding was accepted by Panchapagesa Sastry, J., in Second Appeal and must be deemed to have become final. The only dispute was as to the authority to adopt. Undoubtedly such authority is to be found in the document, Exhibit P-1, described as a will. It is dated 30th May, 1924 and it was registered as a will but beyond the period of four months allowed in respect of documents compulsorily registrable. The contention pressed upon Panchapagesa Sastry, J., was that though it was styled a will, it was really not a will but a document containing a bare power to adopt and therefore the document had to be registered. Not.

having been registered within the prescribed time of four months it was inadmissible in evidence under section 49 of the Registration Act. The learned Judge refused to accept this contention as he held that on the terms of the document it should be considered to be a will and not a document containing a bare power to adopt. He therefore dismissed the second appeals.

M.S. Ramachandra Rao, learned counsel for the appellants, pressed before 11s the same contention. It is necessary, therefore, to first examine the contents of the document and the relevant clauses bearing on this question. The will purports to be executed in favour of one Venkataramiah. The testator proceeds to say:

“As my end is now approaching you shall be the vicharanakarta in respect of my movable and immovable properties and conduct the entire proceedings till the boy whom my wife is hereby empowered to take in adoption attains majority”.

After expressly conferring on the wife authority to adopt the testator makes a further provision with regard to his wife’s sister Mahanandamma, who in law would not be entitled to any rights against the testator or his property. The provision is as follows:

“I have provided that if my junior paternal aunt Venkatalakshmamma and my wife’s sister Mahanandamma do not live amicably, Mahanandamma shall, after she attains majority, act according to the arrangement to be made by the vicharanakarta, namely, Achyutanna Venkataramiah”.

Mr. Ramachandra Rao cited certain decisions of this Court and a decision of the Privy Council in support of his contention that on the terms of the document it could not be held to be a will. The first decision he cited was Seshamma v. Chennappa.1 There the testator, after conferring authority on his widow to adopt, provided that his son-in-law and his father-in-law should take care of his properties until the said adopted boy attains majority and becomes capable of managing the same. The question which arose in that case was whether these two persons would be entitled to obtain probate as executors by implication. There was no question in that case as to whether the document was a will or not. The learned Judges held that the duties which the said persons were directed to perform were not specifically the duties of the guardians of the child whose adoption was contemplated. They considered that it was clear from the document that there was no intention to vest any property in them as the only direction was to protect the property. We do not think that this decision is of much assistance to the appellants because in the case before us there is not merely a direction to protect the property, but there is a specific conferment of power on the Vicharanakarta to conduct the entire proceedings till the adopted boy attained majority. Presumably such conduct of proceedings is in his own right. There is no mention in the document that the Vicharanakarta should be the guardian as such of the adopted boy. The legal conclusion which logically follows from this direction is that till the adopted bo