This is an appeal against the judgment of Panchapakesa Ayyar, J., dismissing an application filed by the appellant herein for extension of the time for furnishing security for costs which he had been directed to furnish by an order of this Court passed by Ramaswami, J., on nth March, 1952, in C.M.P. No. 1676 of 1952. That order was passed in an appeal, A.S. No. 498 of 1951, which the appellant herein had filed in forma pauperis against a decree of the District Court of East Tanjore. Ramaswami, J., directed the appellant to furnish security for costs of the Court below within one week of the reopening of that Court after the summer recess. The learned Judge also proceeded to say that failing such furnishing of security the appeal would stand dismissed. The appellant did not furnish the security within time, but for some reason or other, the appeal itself was never posted formally for being dismissed under Order 41, rule 10(2), Civil Procedure Code. On 18th September, 1953, the appellant filed the application above referred to for excusing the delay in applying for extension of time for furnishing security. This application was supported by a verified petition in which it was stated that the advocate missed noticing the petition which had been posted for hearing on nth March, 1952 and that he was totally unaware of the order passed therein and therefore he never communicated it to his client, the appellant before us. He frankly acknowledged that he was responsible for the delay. He further stated that he came to know of the order only that day, that is, 18th September, 1953, on which day he filed the verified petition, from T.S. Kuppuswami Ayyar, the learned advocate for the contesting respondents. The application was dismissed by Panchapakesa Ayyar, J. An objection was taken on behalf of the respondents before him that the Court had no jurisdiction to extend the time. But the learned Judge was of the opinion that in extreme cases the Court had jurisdiction. He, however, considered that no ground was made out for exercising such jurisdiction. He was apparently inclined to believe the statement of the learned counsel that by oversight he had missed noticing the petition and so had not communicated the order to his client. But, according to him, even if that be true, “that the client should have remained passive for 15 months, without enquiring from his Advocate” was enough to reject the application. He went on to say:

“Such paupers, waiting for 15 months to elapse after the period fixed for furnishing the security has expired, deserve no consideration”.

With respect to the learned Judge, we fail to see how if really the client was never apprised of the order, he could be held guilty of inaction for fifteen months from the period fixed under an order of which he had no knowledge.

On behalf of the respondents, Mr. Kuppuswami Ayyar once more raised the objection that this Court had no jurisdiction to extend the time for furnishing security after the time originally fixed had expired. He put his argument on a two-fold basis. His first basis was that part of the order of Ramaswami, J., by which the learned Judge directed that the appeal would stand dismissed on the appellant failing to furnish security in time. In our opinion, this basis is not open to Mr. Kuppuswami Ayyar. The learned Judge, Ramaswami, J., had no jurisdiction to direct a regular appeal of the valuation of over Rs. 20,000 to stand dismissed. “The proper course should have been for the appeal to have been posted before a Division Bench under Order 41, rule 10(2), Civil Procedure Code. This, as already mentioned, was never done.

The next basis of Mr. Kuppuswami Ayyar’s argument was that even without any order of rejection on the expiry of the period fixed for furnishing security, the appeal automatically stood rejected, and thereafter there was no power in the Court to extend the time for furnishing security. His argument was founded entirely on the decisio