Applicability of the provisions of Sections 9 and 19 f General Clauses Act, 1897.

This is an appeal by the Official Liquidator, the Union Bank, Malabar, Ltd., against the order of the learned District Judge, South Malabar, dismissing an application under section 235 of the Indian Companies Act in limine on the ground, that it was barred by limitation. The application was against the Managing Director of the Union Bank, Malabar, Ltd., its secretary and also the auditor who was appointed by the General Body at the annual general meeting. The Official Liquidator was appointed on 20th June, 1939, and the application was taken out under section 235 of the Indian Companies Act on 20th June, 1942. 19th June, 1942, was a Sunday. The learned District Judge of South Malabar, without going into the merits of the application, dismissed the application on the ground, that it was beyond three years, the period prescribed by section 235 of the Act.

The short point, therefore, for consideration in this appeal is whether the view taken by the learned District Judge is correct. Section 235 of the Indian Companies Act was amended in 1936 by Act XXII of 1936 by which a period for filing an application under the statute was prescribed. The portion of the section which is relevant for the purpose of this discussion is:

“............the Court may, on the application of the liquidator, or of any creditor or contributory made within three years from the date of the first appointment of a liquidator in the winding up or of the misapplication, retainer, misfeasance or breach of trust, as the case may be, whichever is longer, etc.”

The appellant’s Counsel relies upon sections 9 and 10 of the General Clauses Act and contends that the first day, i.e., the day on which the liquidator was appointed, should be excluded under section 9 of the General Clauses Act, and, that, as the Court was closed on the 19th June, 1942, the application filed on the next day is within time under section 10 of the General Clauses Act even if he was not entitled to invoke section 9 of the General Clauses Act. We think that the contention of the learned advocate for the appellant based on, both the sections is correct. Section 9 of the, General Clauses Act provides:

“In any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, it shall be sufficient, for the purpose of excluding the first in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word”from“, and, for the purpose of including the last in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word ‘to’.”

An application under section 235, it is no doubt true, has to be made within three years from the date of the first appointment of the liquidator. But in computing the period of three years, as the word ‘from’ is used in the Act, it is contended that the first day should be excluded from computation. The learned District Judge thought that, as the word ‘within’ was used besides the word ‘from’ there was no scope for the application of section 9 of the General Clauses Act. We do not share that view. The word ‘within ‘was used to denote the period during which action had to be taken by the liquidator by making an application under the section. But, in order to determine the period, one has to compute it beginning with the day on which the liquidator was first appointed. Under section 9 of the General Clauses Act, as the word ‘from’ is used in section 235 of the Indian Companies Act, the first day should ordinarily be excluded. Section 9 of the General Clauses Act gives statutory recognition to the well-established principle applicable to the construction of statutes that ordinarily in computing time the rule observed is to exclude the first and include the last (Vide the decision in Rad Cliffe v. Bartholomew1and the passage in Halsbury’s “Laws of England” (second edition, at page 138). It was, however, argued on behalf of the respondents that section 9 applies only where both the words ‘from and to’ occur in a statute and not otherwise. This construction implies th