The Chief Justice.-

The two petitioners in this petition are the joint pattadars of S. No. 406 in the village of Kamalapuram, Hospet taluk, Bellary district. The said plot of land and other plots covered by S. No. 405, etc., belonging to the petitioners are being irrigated by water taken from sluice No. 68 in the Government Roya Channel through a main distributory channel which runs over some of the lands belonging to the petitioners as well as on poramboke lands. The third respondent is the pattadar of S. No. 404 lying to the north of S. No. 406. Though it is registered as dry, it can be cultivated with wet crops if there is adequate water supply. After obtaining reports from the Revenue Officers the Collector sanctioned a proposal for the acquisition of a portion of S. No. 406 belonging to the petitioners for excavating a field distributory channel to irrigate S. No. 404 belonging to the third respondent, provided the cost of the acquisition was met by the third respondent. Accordingly a notification under section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act was published in the Fort St. George Gazette of the 31st January, 1951, wherein it was stated that an extent of 6 cents in S. No. 406 was needed for a public purpose, to wit, for excavating a field distributory channel to irrigate S. No. 404 from sluice No. 68 of the Roya Channel. After due enquiry under section 5(a) of the Act a notification under section 6 was published on the 24th April, 1951. The petitioners challenge the validity of this acquisition on the ground that the purpose of the acquisition being solely for the benefit of a single individual, namely, the third. respondent, cannot be said to be a public purpose. It must now be taken as well’ established that the power of the State to acquire property compulsorily is a power to acquire it only for a public purpose. Public purpose is a content of the power itself. Mahajan, J., in the recent Supreme Court decision, State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh1 observed thus:

“Public purpose is an essential ingredient in the very definition of the expression ‘eminent domain‘ as given by Nichols and other constitutional writers . . . . The exercise of the power to acquire compulsorily is conditional on the existence of a public purpose .... Jurisdiction to acquire private property by legislation can only be exercised for a public purpose. It may be the purpose of the Union or the purpose of the State or any other public purpose. Private property cannot be acquired for a private purpose.”.

The only question, therefore, is whether the purpose of the impugned acquisition can be said to be a public purpose. There is no definition of “public purpose” either in the Constitution or any other relevant statute. Indeed, as pointed out by the Supreme Court, the expression “public purpose” is not capable of a precise, definition and has not a rigid meaning.

“The definition of the expression is elastic and takes its colour from the statute in which it occurs, the concept varying with the time and state of society and its needs.” (State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh1.)

Mr. M.S. Ramachandra Rao, learned counsel for the petitioners, contended that whatever test be applied it could never be said that when the purpose is ostensibly only to benefit one particular individual, it is a public purpose. In support of his contention he relied on two decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States.

In Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Nebraska Ex rel, Board of Transportation1, the validity of an order of the Nebraska State Board of Transportation requiring a railroad company to surrender a part of its land to private persons for the purpose of building and maintaining their elevator upon it was questioned. The Court held that it was illegal as it would result in the taking of private property of a person without his consent for the private use of another. The principle of the decision is to be found in the following passage:

"This Court, confining itself to what is necessa

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