Mentioning of different provisions of law additionally would make the order appelable.

A preliminary objection is raised by Mr. Muthiah Mudaliar who appears for the contesting respondent that the order of the lower Court is not appealable; and in order to appreciate the point raised by the learned counsel it is necessary to set forth a few facts.

Original Suit No. 71 of 1947 on the file.of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Vellore, is a suit by one Ekambari Ammal, daughter of one Lokanatha Mudaliar, for partition and recovery of possession of her share in the properties which belonged to her father. . Defendants 1 to 3 are the surviving brothers of Lokanatha Mudaliar, and the fourth defendant, Manikkammal, is a sister of the plaintiff and a daughter of Lokanatha Mudaliar. According to the plaintiff, it was stated that before the death of Lokanatha Mudaliar there was a division in status of the joint family properties between Lokanatha, Mudaliar and his three brothers but that there was no separation by metes and bounds and the property remained joint on that score. The plaintiff therefore stated that in the properties which were the joint family properties, Lokanatha Mudaliar had a one-fourth share and plaintiff as one of the two daughters of Lokanatha Mudaliar is entitled to 1/8th in the whole of the properties.

The suit was contested mainly by the first defendant on the ground that before the death of Lokanatha Mudaliar he executed a will by which a fair proportion of his properties was bequeathed in favour of the first defendant. The first defendant admitted that there was a division between Lokanatha Mudaliar and the three brothers and further stated that the division had been completed by metes and bounds with the result that properties were handed over to Lokanatha Mudaliar who had bequeathed them under the will.

The suit went to trial; and the first defendant who propounded the will examined a witness or two. At that stage a compromise was entered into which was signed by the plaintiff and the first defendant as well as by the advocates appearing for them. It is also seen from the original compromise that the second defendant has signed the compromise. When that was filed in Court, the Court passed an order to the effect that as the plaintiff and defendants 1 and 2 appeared at the time of the petition coming on for hearing, a decree in terms of the compromise has been passed. No mention has been made of the fourth defendant in the compromise or of her rights. Subsequently, the fourth defendant filed an application, under Order 9, rule 13, Civil Procedure Code, to set aside the decree passed ex parte against her and the plaintiff filed another application purporting to be under Order 23, rule 3 and section 151, Civil Procedure Code, praying that the decree passed in terms of the compromise filed in Court should be set aside. Various grounds are alleged in the application for setting aside the compromise by the plaintiff but it is unnecessary to re-state them in this appeal. Had it become necessary for us to find out whether a valid compromise had been entered into by the plaintiff and the first defendant, we would probably have gone deeper into that question but then the course which this litigation has taken has rendered it unnecessary for us to delve deep into that matter.

The learned Judge holding that in a partition suit every defendant must be deemed to be a plaintiff and every plaintiff reciprocally must be deemed to be a defendant, on the ground that all the parties entitled to a share in the joint family properties had not signed the compromise, set aside the decree against the fourth defendant on her application. Whether that order is correct or not it is unnecessary for us to determine now. because that has become final and no revision or appeal has been filed against the setting aside of the ex parte decree. On the petition filed by the plaintiff to set aside the compromise decree, the learned Judge purported to act under sections 151 and 153, Civil Procedure Code, set aside the