Venkatarama Ayyar, J.-

We have already held that the acquisitions are for a public purpose and that therefore they are not open to objection under Article 31 (2) of the Constitution. It is now argued before us that the acquisitions are in contravention of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, I of 1894 and that therefore they are invalid. Two objections have been put forward on this score. One is that the petitioner had no opportunity to prefer objections under section 5-A of the Act. To understand the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, it is necessary to set out in brief the scheme of the Act. Under section 4, a preliminary notification is made for the acquisition of the property for any public purpose. Under section 5-A objections are heard and then the final order is passed under section 6. Thereafter notice to all the persons is given under section 9 and after enquiry is held, an award is passed under section 16. On the making of an award under section 16, the property vests absolutely in the Government. There are two exceptions to this procedure provided in section 17. We are concerned only with one of them, section 17(1). That provides that in cases of urgency, the Collector may even before the making of an award, take possession of the property within 15 days of the publication of the notice mentioned in section 9. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the power under section 17(1) could be invoked only after the stage has been reached when notices are issued under section 9 which must itself be only after hearing objections under section 5-A. So far, we agree.

It is necessary now to refer to section 17(4) which is the relevant provision. It runs as follows:-

“In the case of any land to which, in the opinion of the Provincial Government the provisions of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) are applicable, the Provincial Government may direct that the provisions of section 5-A shall not apply, and, if it does so direct, a declaration may be made under section 6 in respect of the land at any time after the publication of the notification under section 4, sub-section (1).”

The notice that was issued in this case is in these terms:

“Whereas it appears to His Excellency the Governor of Madras that the land specified below needed for a public purpose, to wit, for construction of houses, notice to that effect is hereby given all whom it may concern in accordance with the provisions of section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act I of 1894.”

And then the notice proceeds to state:

“Under section 17(4), His Excellency the Governor of Madras directs that in view of the urgency of the case, the provisions of section 5-A of the Act shall not apply to the acquisition of the waste or avable lands specified below.”

Therefore as action was taken under section 17(4), section 5-A will have no application.

But Mr. Rajah Ayyar relies on the fact that section 17(4) refers to the provisions of sub-section (1) and argues that by implication it must be taken that the powers under section 17(4) could be exercised only after objections are heard under section 5-A and notices are issued under section 9. This argument is against the express language of sub-section (4) which clearly enacts that the provisions of section 5-A shall not apply in case of orders under that sub-section. To adopt the construction contended for by Mr. Rajah Ayyar will be to render sub-section (4) wholly nugatory. What all is required under section 17(4) is that the Government must be satisfied that there is such urgency as is contemplated by section 17(1). If they are so satisfied, they are entitled to pass an order under section 17(4) suspending the application of section 5-A and that is what has been done in this case. Mr. Rajah Ayyar also suggested that there was no such urgency as would justify invoking the powers under section 17(1) and that there was no inquiry about any such urgency. We are of opinion that whether an urgency exis

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