There is no dispute that the wakf in question relates to property worth more than Rs.50,000 as the same has been conceded by both the parties. But the question that has been decided in the second appeal is with respect to the trusteeship of the Mohideenia mosque in the village of Damaramadugu, Kovur Taluk, Nellore District. We have found that the plaintiff-respondent is entitled to the trusteeship and the subject-matter of the appeal to the Supreme Court is whether the plaintiff has the right to function as such. Such being the case, it cannot be said that the subject-matter of the suit is capable of valuation and as such paragraph (1) of section no of the Code of Civil Procedure and clause (1)(a) of Article 133 of the Constitution cannot, in strict terms, apply. But what is contended for the petitioner is that in the plaint the relief asked for includes, in addition to the prayer for a declaration that the plaintiff is a validly appointed trustee of the Mohideenia mosque and that the appointment of the defendant was void and inoperative, another prayer for the recovery of possession of the properties endowed to the mosque and the sums of money which may be found due from the defendant on a proper rendition of accounts by him for the period of his possession of the properties. Under these circumstances we are asked to say, that the possession of property worth about Rs.50,000 is the value of the subject-matter of the proceedings and since the judgment and decree of the High Court have reversed the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court, the petitioner is entitled to a certificate for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of India. In our opinion this contention cannot be accepted for, though there is an ancillary prayer for recovery of possession of properties and sums of money on a rendition of accounts, and a prayer for a permanent injunction restraining the defendant and his men from interfering with the plaintiff’s right to manage the mosque and its endowments, still the essential subject-matter of the suit is the post of trusteeship of the mosque and nothing more. If it is found that the plaintiff is the validly appointed trustee, then automatically the other reliefs follow. If, on the other hand the plaintiff’s title as trustee is negatived, then the other reliefs cannot be granted. Therefore we have to take it that the real relief asked for is with respect to trusteeship and if that is so, clause (1)(a) of Article 133 of the Constitution cannot be invoked. But it is contended that the judgment, decree, or final order involves directly or indirectly some claim or question respecting property of that value and since there is a reversing judgment even if the appeal does not involve any substantial question of law, still the appellant is entitled to be granted leave. Clause (1)(b) of Article 133 of the Constitution is in pari materia with the second paragraph of section 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure and that statutory provision has been the subject of construction in this Court. The trend of decisions of this Court has been to the effect that paragraph (1) applies to cases where the decree awards a particular sum, or property of a particular value or refuses that relief. That is, where the subject-matter of the dispute is of a particular value. In Subramania Ayyar v. Sellammal1Srinivasa Ayyangar, J., observe as follows:

“In my judgment the first clause applies to cases where the decree awards a particular sum, or property of a particular value or refuses that relief, i.e., to cases where the object matter in dispute is of a particular value. In fact the words ‘objects in dispute are used in the provisions relating to appeals from Guernsey. If the operation of the decision is confined only to the particular object matter, clause (2) does not apply, and unless the case satisfies the conditions in clause (1) there is no right of appeal. If the decision beyond awarding relief in respect of the par