Acquisition of ownership by adverse possessin.

These two second appeals arise out of O.S.No.113 of 1944 on the file of the Subordinate Judge’s Court of South Kanara. The appellants in each of these appeals are persons who allege themselves to be the owners of the properties which are the subject-matter of dispute. Defendants 10, 11 and 8 are the appellants in S.A.No.2 of 1949 and defendants 2 and 4 are the appellants in S.A.No.47 of 1949. The plaintiffs, who are the contesting respondents, are the trustees of the suit temple appointed by the Hindu Religious Endowments Board and they seek to recover possession of the plaint properties from the defendants on the ground that they are temple properties. The appellants in these appeals originally belonged to one family which became divided long ago and they put forward the contention that the properties are not tempi; properties but belonged to the joint family of which they constituted members, though there was an obligation fastened on them, viz., that with part of the income from the properties certain ceremonies in the temple should be conducted. Both the lower Courts found that the temple is the owner and directed surrender of possession of the properties by the defendants. Hence these second appeals.

The first argument put forward is that the plaint temple is not the owner of the properties mentioned in schedules A to C, and in support of it counsel for the appellants in each of these appeals relied upon certain documents which, according to them, have been misconstrued by both the lower Courts. It is the admitted case that the family of the appellants was at one time the trustee of this Sri Mahalingeswara Mahadevaru Devastanam and it had also the right of archakatvam i.e., performing the pooja in the temple. Both Messrs. K. Srinivasa Rao and T. Krishna Rao for the appellants contend that the lower Courts are wrong in interpreting the expression “Mahalinga Devaiu Uttara” occurring in Exs.P-1 and P-2 as meaning absolute ownership of the temple. The learned Judges in the courts below have understood the expression in these documents as signifying that there have been admissions by the managers of the defendants family as early as 1858 and 1863 that the plaint properties are the deity’s properties. It is now contended that the word “uttara” does not connote any absolute right in the temple but that what is meant is only that the temple has some sort of right over the income of the properties to be utilised for the performance of the religious ceremonies. In Ex.P-2 Ram Bhatta, the then head and manager of the defendants family styles himself as the mokthessor or trustee of Srimath Pervaje Mahalinga Devaru and the property dealt with therein is described as “Mahalinga Devaru’s Uttara”. There is no word mentioned anywhere in the judgment of either of the lower courts that this expression means anything other than complete ownership of the temple. Both the trial Judge and the appellate Judge have understood the expression as vesting the ownership in the temple. Moreover, Ex. P-4, the settlement register, describes the temples as “Wargdar” or the owner of these properties The contest in both the lower Courts was that the defendants family is the owner as contradistinguished with the ownership of the temple. Some recent documents were produced on behalf of the defendants justifying their contention that the temple cannot be said to have absolute rights over the properties. D.W.1 who is the first defendant and one of the chief contesting defendants, did not depose that the expression “uttara” meant anything other than absolute rights. The learned Subordinate Judge, in paragraphs 17 and 18 of the judgment, discusses. the meaning and import of the expression “uttara” occurring in Exs.P-1 and P-2 and nowhere do we find any statement by him that the defendants put forward the contention that the expression “uttara” meant anything except “full fee simple” In view of the admissions contained in Exhibits P-1 and P-2 and t