Tests required for exemption.

The only question in this revision is whether the debt due to the respondent is exempted under section 4(h) of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act (IV of 1938).

The facts are simple and are not in dispute. The first petitioner and his father executed a promissory note Exhibit B-1, dated 25th April, 1929, in favour of one Subbarayudu for a sum of Rs. 200. After some renewals of the debt in favour of Subbarayudu and after his death, petitioners executed a promissory note, dated 16th February, 1936, for a sum of Rs 378-4-6 in favour of Perindevamma, wife of Subbarayudu. On 21st February, 1926, Subbarayudu executed a will, where under Perindevamma was given a life-estate in all his properties and the vested remainder was given to his daughter, Ranganayakamma, the respondent herein. Though the definite date of the death of Perindevamma is not known, it is clear from the evidence that she died only subsequent to 24th July, 1938. Ranganayakamma filed S.C. No. 154 of 1944 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Guntur for recovery of the amount due under the promissory note and obtained a decree therein. The petitioners filed an application under section 19 of the Act for scaling down the debt. The learned Subordinate Judge held that the petitioners were agriculturists but they were not entitled to have the debt scaled down as the debt was due to Perindevamma, a woman, on 1st October, 1937 and the value of her life estate did not exceed Rs. 6,000. He dismissed the petition. The petitioners have filed the above revision against that order.

The learned counsel for the petitioners contended that Perindevamma was only a life-estate holder and, therefore, only that portion of the debt, which she could appropriate for herself as a life-estate holder, is only liable to be exempted. The relevant provision of section 4 reads:

"Nothing in this Act shall affect debts and liabilities of an agriculturist falling under the following heads:

(h) any debt or debts due to a woman on the 1st October, 1937, provided that the value of the property owned by her on that date including the principal amount of the debt or debts so due did not exceed Rs. 6,000.

The object of this exemption is to protect women of slender means from the consequences of the drastic provisions of the Act. If the contention of the learned counsel is accepted, not only will it lead to many complications but, in some cases, the protection intended to be given under this section may become illusory. A creditor on 1st October, 1937, may be a man and the remainder-man may be a woman or sice versa. The remainder may be vested or contingent. Courts would have to value the life-estates and remainders vested or contingent. Proportional values will have to be fixed on complicated calculations. The nature of the woman’s estate would have to be ascertained, viz., whether it is a life-estate, absolute estate, woman’s estate, or a woman’s estate with an absolute power of alienation conferred on the holder of that estate. I do not think that the Legislature contemplated, by enacting the aforesaid simple clause, to comprehend all the aforesaid questions. It obviously intended to provide for two tests for the application of that exemption, (i) whether the debt is due to a woman and (ii) whether the value of property owned by her, whether as life-estate holder or as absolute owner, did not exceed Rs. 6,000. I cannot rely upon the hidden meaning of the Legislature but must give effect to its express intention. I must be guided only by the plain meaning of the express words used in the section. Then two questions arise for consideration:

(i) What is the debt due to a woman, who is a life-estate holder? (ii) What is the value of the property owned by her?

The first question depends upon he meaning of the word “due”. Ordinarily, it means payable. As a noun, it connotes an existing obligation. As an adjective, it means capable of being justly demanded, claimed as of right, payable (Ram