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1951 Supreme(Mad) 331

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Justice Chandra Reddi, J.
C. Chenchanna Naidu
Versus
The Praja Seva Transports, Ltd., Cuddappah
C.M.P. Nos. 1097 and 1098 of 1951.
Decided On : 26 October 1951

Advocates:
K. Rajah Aiyar and A. Bhujanga Rao for Petitioner.
Vepa P. Sarathi for the State Counsel (John and Row) C.A. Vaithialingam and C. Kondiah for Respondents.

Order on application for issuance of writ of certiorari reviewable.

Headnote:Constitution of India-Article 226 -Order for issuance of writ of certiorari held liable for review for apparent errors on the face of the record.

Order.-

This is a petition for review of our order in C. M. P. No. 605 of 1951, dated 9th January, 1951, declining to issue a writ of certiorari calling for records in G.O. Ms. No. 5424 M., Home Department, Government of Madras, dated 27th December, 1950, and to quash the said Government Order. The circumstances that necessitated the filing of that petition are the following:

The petitioner along with the first respondent herein and some others applied to the Regional Transport Authority, Cuddappah, for pucca permits for running three stage carriages on Cuddappah Madanapalle route via Kurubola Kota. The Regional Transport Authority rejected the application of the petitioner while that of first respondent was allowed.

Against this order an appeal was filed to the Central Road Traffic Board, Madras, by the petitioner. The Appellate Tribunal cancelled the permit granted to the first respondent and directed the issue of one to the petitioner herein.

Thereupon the first respondent preferred a revision, to the Government of Madras against the order of the Central Board Traffic Board. The Government in its G.O. Ms. No. 5424 M., Home Department, referred to above allowed the revision petition filed by the first respondent and set aside the order of the Central Road Traffic Board in so far as it related to the granting of a permit to the petitioner.

This led the petitioner to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the manner and for the relief mentioned above. The main ground upon which that petition was based was that the order of the Government disclosed no reason for interfering with that of the Appellate Authority and therefore was one passed arbitrarily.

When this petition came before us on 9th January, we rejected it observing that we saw no reason to hold that the State Government has exercised jurisdiction vested in it under section 64-A of the Madras Motor Vehicles Act, illegally or with material irregularity and that there were no grounds for interference.

A day or two after the disposal of the petition, the jurisdiction of the State Government to exercise the revisional powers under section 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act without finding whether the order sought to be revised was illegal, irregular or improper as required by the provisions of the section was questioned in another application for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the order of the State Government in similar circumstances filed by an aggrieved party. We issued notice on that petition which ultimately resulted in pronouncement inter alia that the order ex facie should show that the Government applied its mind to a consideration of the question whether the order under revision was one under one or the other of the three categories mentioned in that section 64-A.

As a result of the issue of notice in that application the petitioner has come forward with C. M. P. No. 1098 of 1951 for a review of our order dated 9th January, 1951.

The first point that arises for consideration in this petition is whether we have jurisdiction to review the order in C. M. P. No. 605 of 1951 and whether this petition is competent.

This petition is resisted on behalf of the first respondent that we have no inherent powers to review the order passed under Article 226 of the Constitution. In support of this contention Mr. Vaithialingam, the learned counsel for the first respondent, relied on a ruling of a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in In re Prahlad Krishna1. But we do not think that that case carries the contention of the respondents very far. What was observed by the Chief Justice Chagla with whom the other two learned Judges agreed was “that the Court has no inherent power of review and that the power of review like that of an appeal should be conferred by a statute”, and that the Criminal Procedure Code did not vest any powers of review in the High Court. It was also remarked that Article 226 of the Constitution did not confer upo















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